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3Introduction: Objectives of this Benchmarking Study
This integrated steel case study for Nippon Steel (NSC) was completed under a
three-year research grant from the Sloan Foundation.  The project examines, through a
series of case studies, US and Japanese firms that are recognized leaders in using
information technology1.  The purpose is to analyze how these firms have organized and
managed the use of informational technology to achieve long-term, sustainable
advantage. While each case is complete in itself, each is part of this larger study2. While
there is no comparable integrated US steel company case, the case research on mini-mills
has been completed for Tokyo Steel and is underway for Nucor.
This case for a large integrated steel producer, along with other cases3, suppo ts
an initial research hypothesis that leading software users in the US and Japan are very
sophisticated in the ways they have integrated software into their management strategies.
They use it to institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an
interactive basis.  In Japan this strategy has involved heavy reliance on customized and
semi-customized software (Rapp 1995) but is changing towards a more selective use of
                                         
1 In this paper and the study, software, information technology (IT) and systems are used interchangeably.
In addition, when referring to the firm as a whole, the text will use “it,” but when referring to management,
“they” will be used.  Integrated steel covers blast furnace producers of steel as opposed to those using
electric arc furnaces.
2 The industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-Yokado), semiconductors (NEC and AMD),
pharmaceuticals (Takeda and Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), investment banking (Nomura
and Credit Suisse First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and Nationwide), autos (Toyota), steel (integrated
mills and mini-mills, Nippon Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (Isetan and Federated).
Nationwide has replaced USAA, as the latter was unable to participate.  These industries and cases were
generally selected based on the advice and research of specific industry centers funded by the Sloan
Foundation.  These are the computer and software center at Stanford, the semi-conductor and software
centers at Berkeley, the financial services center at Wharton (University of Pennsylvania), the
pharmaceutical and auto centers at MIT, the steel project at Carnegie-Mellon, the food services project at
the University of Minnesota and the apparel center at Harvard.  The case writer and the research team for
this case thus wish to express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for making this work
possible and to the Sloan industry centers for their invaluable assistance.  They especially appreciate the
time and guidance given by the steel research center at Carnegie-Mellon as well as the staff at NSC and
ENICOM who were so generous with their time.  Still, the views expressed in this case are those of the
author and not necessarily those of NSC or its management.
4package software managed via customized systems.  An example of this is Nippon
Steel’s development of an E-commerce system to automate its traditional faxed-based
ordering system from the Japanese trading companies (TCs).  In turn, US firms, such as
Merck, who have often relied more on packaged software, are now customizing more.
This is especially true for the systems needed to integrate software packages into
something more closely linked with the firm’s business strategies, markets, and
organizational structure.
Thus, coming from different directions, there appears to be some convergence in
approach by these leading software users.  These cases confirm what some other analysts
have hypothesized; a coherent business strategy is a necessary condition for a successful
information technology (IT) strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993.4  These strategic links for
Nippon Steel and the Japanese steel industry are presented in the following case.5
                                                                                                                   
3 This refers to cases for which interviews have been completed.  See footnote 2.
4 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business
working paper: William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information
Technology: The Emergence of Controlled Production,” December 1998.  Also see: William V. Rapp,
“Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Using Information Technology: Emergence of Controlled
Production, “Best Papers Proceedings, Association of Japanese Business Studies, Salt Lake City, UT, June
1999.
5 All the cases are being written with a strategic focus.  That is, each examines a firm’s IT strategy rather
than the specific software or IT systems used.  In this sense, they illustrate how IT is used to improve
competitiveness rather than what specific software a firm is using.  The latter is generally only noted to
illustrate and explain the former.  This emphasis was not specified when the project began but has evolved
as research has progressed.  There are three major reasons the cases have become focused this way.  First,
at a detailed level, all these firms have unique software and IT systems due to the way each weaves
organization with packaged and custom software.  There is thus little others could learn if a case just
explained each firm’s detailed IT system or systems.  Further, the cases would be long and would quickly
drown the reader in data since IT pervades all aspects of these very large corporations.  This was apparent
at an early stage in the study when the project team tried to develop IT organization charts for Takeda,
Merck, and NEC.  The second reason is that at a general level, differences in firm IT systems can be almost
trivial since there are only a limited number of operating system options, e.g. IBM mainframes, UNIX
workstations, and Windows or MAC based PCs.  Third, information technology changes very rapidly and
thus each firm is constantly upgrading and evolving its systems.  So detailed descriptions of each IT system
would rapidly become obsolete.  For these reasons, focusing the cases on strategic principles developed as
the best way to explain to readers something they could use and apply in their own situations.  This
reasoning has been confirmed when we have presented the material in different forums as discussants have
commented favorably on the approach.  Equally importantly, in our interviews and conversations with
management, this is where they have focused their responses.  That is, as the various cases illustrate, the
5The experience of Nippon Steel, along with the other cases, also illustrates that
the implementation and design of each company’s software and software strategy is
unique to its competitive situation, industry, and strategic objectives.  These factors
influence how each chooses between packaged and customized software options for
achieving specific goals and how each measures its success.  Indeed, as part of each
firm’s strategic integration, Nippon Steel and the other leading software users
interviewed have linked software strategies with overall management goals.  This is
achieved through clear mission statements that explicitly note the importance of
information technology to the firm’s success.
Each has coupled this view with active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT
(information technology) support group participation in the firm’s business and decision
making structure.  Thus for firms such as NSC the totally independent MIS department is
a thing of the past.  This may be one reason why outsourcing for NSC has not been a real
option except to a captive subsidiary, ENICOM.  The company’s relatively successful
business performance in steel is not based solely on software, however.  Rather, as will
be described below, software is an integral element of the firm’s overall management
strategy with respect to producing and selling steel to major customers, especially the
Japanese auto companies.  This approach also plays a key role in serving corporate goals,
such as: enhancing mill productivity by improving production scheduling, reducing
                                                                                                                   
firms manage their IT decision-making by following a set of strategic principles integrated with their view
of their competitive environments.  This is similar to Nelson and Winter’s (1982) rules and routines for
other kinds of management decisions and innovations, and illustrates these firms’ evolutionary approach to
IT use and development.  Their basic reasons for this incorporate the points noted above, i.e., each firm’s
unique system, the limited operating system options, and IT’s rapid technical change.  Based on what the
case study teams have learned, therefore, it is these firms’ strategic approaches, including the concept of
controlled production explained later, that seem to have the widest applicability and offer other
organizations the most potential insights without becoming dated in how to use IT to improve
competitiveness.  The detailed strategy describe here, though, only applies to steel in Japan.
6inventories, and strengthening customer relations.  The systems are coupled with an
appropriate approach to marketing, production, customer service, new product
development, and constant cost reduction.  All this reflects NSC’s clear understanding of
its business, its industry, and the firm’s competitive strengths within this context.
This clear business vision, especially of the E-commerce and customized casting
strategies described below, enables NSC’s management to select, develop, and use the
appropriate software to assist its steel mills to operate at a higher and more consistent
level of performance, and to augment customer support.  In turn, NSC has also integrated
this support to the mills into a total support system for the firm, including its overseas
affiliates.  That support is coupled with the company’s overall operations, including
accounting systems.  Since this overall vision has also impacted other corporate
decisions, NSC seems to have strong human and financial resources, as well.  (See
Appendices I & II on Strategy & Operations as well as Firm & Industry Data).
Nippon Steel also shares some common themes with other leading software users,
such as the creation of large proprietary interactive databases.  These databases promote
automatic feedback between various stages of the order, production, and delivery process.
NSC’s ability to use IT to economize on traditional delivery systems and inventory
practices, such as the amount of steel that must be held for various automobile models, is
also a common theme for other leading software users.  In addition, it has been able,
organizationally and competitively, to build beneficial feedback cycles or loops that
increase productivity in different areas.  Those areas include customer service,
accounting, and product availability.  Cycle times have been reduced and the production
and delivery of products to the customer has been improved.
7Management recognizes that better cycle times between client orders and ultimate
delivery reduce costs and also improve business forecasts, since projections are for
shorter periods.  Customer satisfaction is enhanced as well through more timely delivery
of the product.  One example of this is that NSC’s new E-commerce system (Dazai 1997
and Dazai & Maruyama 1997) allows the customer to automatically track an order
through the production process without phoning mill personnel.  The customer does not
have to wait to discover when the order will be shipped and delivered.  The ultimate
customer can also by-pass the trading company in this process, again saving time and
phone calls.  Further, this system has eliminated potential errors from erroneous copying
of information from faxes that, under the old system, might have caused additional
delays, expensive errors, and customer frustration.  Telephone and fax charges have been
reduced as well.  So software inputs are critical factors in NSC’s and other leading users’
overall business strategies.  The results for doing it well are strongly positive, while the
implications for competitors are potentially negative.
An important consideration in this respect is the emergence of a new strategic.
This paradigm differs from mass and lean production in that mass production
dramatically improved on craft production through economies of scale in using
standardized products, and lean production improved on mass production by  making
production more continuous and tying it more closely to actual demand.  What we call
“controlled” production seems to significantly improve productivity by using IT to
monitor, control, and link every aspect of producing and delivering a product or service,
including after sales support and product changes.  Some of these effects for Nippon
Steel are illustrated in the case that follows.  It describes NSC’s new E-commerce system,
8production scheduling algorithm, proposed accounting system, joint auto industry
inventory control project, and customized casting system.
Such controlled production is only possible by actively using IT and software
systems to continuously monitor and control functions that previously had been parts of a
business structure that only responded to changes in expected or actual consumer
demand, rather than influencing or stimulating those changes.  This may be why t ese
firms’ skillful use of IT is viewed by themselves and industry analysts as important to
their business success.  But this is only true when IT is integrated with the firm’s
operational and organizational standpoints, reflecting its overall business strategy and its
clarity of competitive vision.
At NSC the software and systems development people are part of the decision-
making structure within each steel mill, as illustrated below for the Kimitsu Works.  The
head office unit only manages the overall system or firm-wide projects, such as the new
accounting system.  In turn, IT systems are integral to the way NSC organizes, delivers,
and supports the mills and the steel business from product development to ordering and
production, and through to delivery and after-sales support.  This sequence is particularly
critical in steel where the demand and supply for particular products shift according to the
customer’s business and economic situation.  That is, as economic conditions affect the
demand for autos, ships, and construction differently, the mix of steel products demanded
by the customer constantly shifts.
Therefore Seagate Technology is certainly correct for Nippon Steel when it states
in its 1997 Annual Reports: “We are experiencing a new industrial revolution, one more
powerful than any before it.  In this emerging digital world of the Third Millennium, the
9new currency will be information.  How we harness it will mean the difference between
success and failure, between having competitive advantage and being an also-ran.”
In NSC’s case, as with the other leading software users examined in this case
study series, the key to using software successfully is to develop a mix of packaged and
customized software that supports the firm’s business strategies and differentiates it from
competitors.  NSC management has done this by using IT to enhance its existing
organizational strengths, rather than trying to adapt its organization structure to the
software used.  They have also looked to functional and market gains to justify the
additional expense incurred in customizing certain systems.  This includes factoring in
the related costs of integrating customized and packaged SW into a single information
system while training employees to use it.  This integration is done by first assessing the
possible business uses of software within the organization and its operations.  Particular
focus is placed on IT’s role in enhancing NSC’s core competencies in developing,
producing, and delivering many different qualities and types of steel.  Management
rejects the view that IT systems are generic products, best developed by outside vendors
who keep costs low through economies of scale, and who can more easily afford to invest
in the latest technologies.6
                                         
6 Nippon Steel an the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross-
national pairs of firms in key industries.  In principle, each pair of cases focuses on a Japanese and
American firm in an industry where software is a significant and successful input into competitive
performance.  Excepting Nationwide Insurance, the firms examined are ones recommended by the Sloan
industry centers as ones using SW successfully.  Nationwide was recommended by a leading securities
analyst as a replacement for USAA.  So all are recognized by their industry as being good at using IT to
improve competitiveness.  To develop these “best-practice” studies, the research team combined analysis of
current research results with questionnaires and direct interviews.  Further, to relate these materials to
previous work as well as the expertise located in each industry center, the team talked with the industry
centers’ managers.  In addition, the study coupled new questionnaires with the materials used in a previous
study to either update or obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-1995 research (Rapp
1995).  This method enabled the researchers to relate each candidate and industry to earlier results.  The
team also worked with the different industry centers to develop a set of questions that specifically relate to
a firm’s business strategy and software’s role within that.  Some questions address issues that appear
10
Approach: Methodology and Questions
In undertaking this and the other case studies to assess the importance for each
firm of the issues noted above, the project team sought to answer key questions while
recognizing firm, country, and industry differences.  These have been explained in the
summary paper referenced in footnote 4.  They are set forth in Appendix I as well, where
NSC’s profile is presented based on company interviews and other research.  Readers
who wish to assess how NSC’s strategies and approaches to using IT address these issues
may wish to review the summary prior to reading the case.  For others, it may represent a
useful outline.7
Introduction to Case
                                                                                                                   
relatively general across industries such as inventory control.  Others such as managing the IC
manufacturing process are more specific to a particular industry.  The focus has been to establish the firm’s
perception of its industry and its competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a
software strategy.  The team also contacted customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine
whether competitive benefits or impacts perceived by the firm were recognized outside the organization.
These sources provided additional data on measures of competitiveness as well as industry strategies and
structure.  The case studies are thus based on extensive interviews by the project team on IT’s use and
integration into management strategies to improve competitiveness in specific industries, augmenting
existing data on industry dynamics, firm organizational structure and management strategy collected from
the industry centers.  Further, data was gathered from outside sources and firms or organizations that had
helped in the earlier project.  Finally, the US and Japanese companies in each industry were selected based
on being perceived as successfully using software in a key role in their competitive strategies.  In turn, each
firm saw its use of software in this manner while the competitive benefits were generally confirmed after
further research.  In the case of steel, the team was particularly aided by presentations given by the
Carnegie-Mellon steel group at the annual Sloan Industry Center Meetings from 1997-99 as well as the
book produced by that Center (Ahlbrandt, Fruehan, and Giarratani 1996).
7 The questions are broken in to the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy,
Industry Related Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human
Resources, Organization, Various Measures such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction,
and finally some Conclusions and Results.  The questions cover a range of issues from direct use of
software to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to
industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational integration, to beneficial loops, to training
11
The case begins by placing Japan’s steel industry in a competitive context and
then examines the governmental policies, economic factors, and competitive dynamics
affecting Japan’s steel markets and its producers.  As Japan’s leading steel producer, and
the largest in the world (Appendix II), Nippon Steel’s evolution, competitive situation,
and current strategies are an integral part of this picture.  Its situation illustrates well the
competitive issues facing Japan’s steel producers.  As Japanese firms are being
aggressively challenged in both export and domestic markets, it is critical that NSC
successfully manages its planned transition to a new competitive model.  This is because
while it has diversified as a corporation into other areas, not all these efforts have been
successful (Nagai 1998). Furthermore, steel still represents the overwhelming part of total
revenues, operating earnings, and invested capital (Appendix II and Ostrom 1996).
Also, several of NSC’s more successful diversification efforts, such as its entry
into software and information systems (ENICOM) or engineering services are primarily
based on its expertise in steel making and its continued progress in that business (Fortune
1998).  NSC’s organizational structure and software product choices help one understand
the company’s use and demand for IT.  The case study describes how NSC uses IT as a
tool to create competitive advantage in selling and delivering steel products.  The last
section summarizes the research and case study findings and identifies other potential
strategic benefits from NSC’s use of IT. But to appreciate IT’s role within NSC’s steel
business, some industry, market, and economic characteristics need to be explained.8
                                                                                                                   
and institutional dynamics, and finally to inter-industry comparisons.  These are summarized for Nippon
Steel in Appendix I.
8 O’Brien (1992) describes how “steel was one of Japan’s earliest and possibly most dramatic industrial
successes....The industry was rebuilt in the early 1950s, and...for the next two decades, Japan’s steel output
grew at an average annual rate of 15%.  By 1976, the industry was capable of producing nearly 150 million
tons of steel yearly and was responsible for 16% of the world’s steel market share.  Even in the mid-1980s,
by which time Japan had lost its superiority in steel to Korean companies, Japan produced over 20 percent
12
The Industry Context: Japanese Steel Industry
In his 1996 review of Japanese Steel (Ostrom 1996), Douglas Ostrom describes
an industry that “has been seen as an exemplar of Japanese industrial competitiveness.”
In deed, in the 1960s and 1970s, it was perceived globally as an industrial juggernaut that
dominated the world steel industry and gave Japanese steel users, such as auto
manufacturers and shipbuilders, a huge competitive advantage (Ahlbrandt, Fruehan, and
Giarratani 1996 – A, F, & G).  This industrial clout was highly concentrated in five
domestic firms (O’Brien 1992).  This competitive benefit persisted through the early
1980s due to the weak yen, and Japanese auto and heavy equipment producers, such as
Toyota and Komatsu, were helped accordingly.  Even during the Bubble Period, from
1985-1990, when the yen was strong, the major steel producers did fairly well due to
buoyant domestic demand (NSC 1997a, Ostrom 1996, and Nagai 1998).
Competitive pressures began to shift significantly during the 1990s, however, due
to two forces (A, F & G 1996).  One was the emergence of several new and efficie t
competitors such as POSCO in Korea and Nucor in the U.S. (Fujitani 1995, Ostrom 1996
and Ahlbrandt, Fruehan &Giarratani 1996).  The second was the serious decline in
domestic steel demand as the Japanese economy felt the combined pressures of the
Bubble collapse and a continuing strong yen (NSC 1997a and Appendix II).  As seen in
Appendix II, these effects were only somewhat ameliorated by growth in steel export
demand due to a rapidly expanding Asian economy (Fujitani 1995, Nagai 1998, NSC
                                                                                                                   
of the world’s steel exports.”  See A, F & G (1996) for discussion of impact declining steel demand in late
1970s and early 1980s on all producers globally.
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1997a).  While steel production hit an annual rate of 110 million tons toward the end of
1991, it subsequently fell 15 million tons due to the Bubble collapse of which only 5
million of this was covered by increased Asian demand (Fujitani 1995).
While some firms have tried to solve the problem of declining demand by just
further rationalizing production, reducing their labor force, and diversifying into new
products (Fujitani 1995, NSC 1997a, and Salomon 1997), the reality is such that solutions
generally can and have been replicated by competitors.9  For example, while the total
employment of the five large Japanese integrated producers fell from 150,000 in 1985 to
90,000 in 1995, similar drops were posted by the top 5 US integrated producers, which
fell from 150,000 in 1985 to 77,000 in 1995 (Fujitani 1995).  Indeed, NSC continued to
decrease its steel workforce from 32,344 in 1995 to 26,275 in 1997 (NSC 1997a) and
then to 24,000 in 1998 (interview ENICOM).  While employment reduction helped NSC
maintain competitiveness, this tactic did not really raise production at its domestic mills.
Because price and cost declines were generally emulated by competitors, there was no
increased demand for NSC’s products.
Therefore, several Japanese steel companies, including NSC, began to sell some
of their remaining stock and other appreciated assets to cover operating losses (NSC
1997, Harada 1998 and Appendix II), just as the Japanese banks and some other large
Japanese manufacturers, such as Nissan have had to do.  However, there was no real
business benefit from this action since it just diminishes the actual “hidden” reserves
                                         
9 See Appendix II “Cost Reduction Efficiency Indices Major Japanese Producers 1994-98 (Average
1994=100)” where cost reductions of 6% by NSC are shown as being replicated by other large integrated
Japanese produces.  Similarly, weak Yen benefits that helped all steel producers from 1980 to ’85 but came
to an abrupt halt in October 85 with the rapid Yen appreciation due to the Plaza Accord, resulted in the
same US FDI increase by all producers (Ostrom 1996).  The logical strategy for each was affiliation
through technical assistance and partial or complete acquisition.
14
while doing nothing to improve competitiveness in steel (NSC 1997 and Appendix II).  It
was only a temporary solution to cover losses, not a long-term strategy to address the
basic problem of a global commodity industry with large swings in demand and price,
often driven by foreign exchange rates, with little relation to the industry’s efficiency.
For Japanese producers particularly, tr de and international competition now play
a much larger role than before in determining profitability and the demand for Japanese
steel in domestic and export markets.  While exports have been an important demand for
Japanese integrated producers since the 1960s (O’Brien 1992) and continue as an area of
intense (even acrimonious) negotiations with the US, gone are the days when Japanese
firms were always the low cost producer (Harada 1998, Tilton 1000, O’Brien 1992), or
could constantly move into higher grade steel.10  Ra h r, a strong or weak Yen relative to
the dollar or currencies tied to the dollar will drive prices for Japanese steel both overseas
and domestically (Ostrom 1996).
This is because imports into Japan from Korea are particularly sensitive to this
situation, having grown from 647,000 tons in 1980 to 2,596,000 in 1996 (NSC 1997a).
Further, Japanese auto producers and shipbuilders, who indirectly compete with less
expensive steel from Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil when the yen is strong, will pressure
Japanese steel producers to reduce prices during these periods.  For example, in early
1997, prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, K. Yoshida (Salomon 1997) describes this
situation at some length in assessing the competitive and revenue outlook for Japanese
producers.  At the time he was optimistic for Japanese steel producers, given his
                                         
10 JEI (Choy 1999) and articles in Japan Times (October 99) describe current trade (dumping) controversy
between US and Japan over seamless stainless steel pipe, a very high technology product used mostly in
nuclear facilities.
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expectations of continued economic strength in Asia (and thus growing steel demand),
coupled with strong Asian currencies other than the yen (Appendix II).11
That this expectation did not actually materialize due to Asia’s economic collapse
(which started in Thailand), does not change the validity of his observation concerning
how external demand and exchange rates impact Japan’s steel industry.12  Indeed, Mr.
Nagai, of Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, made a similar argument on how a weak Yen
could potentially help the profitability of Japanese steel producers (Nagai 1998).  This is
because he expected, in  mid-1998, that an Asian recovery would reverse the weakness
seen during the first part of 1998, when a very weak Korean Won and the Asian Financial
Crisis kept this potential impact in check (Harada 1998).
Given these conditions, it is very difficult for Japanese integrated steel producers
to anticipate either prices or demand.  Also, such international pressures have been
exacerbated by Japan’s continued economic weakness that limits demand generally.
Therefore, other large Japanese corporations are not building or expanding capacity
either. The net effect has been that NSC’s steel assets and revenues have been essentially
constant since 1993.  Added to these considerations is the assessment of some observers
that Japan still has too much steel capacity (A, F & G 1996, Harada 1998a, and Tilton
1999).  For companies like NSC to rationalize operations further and shut down more
blast furnaces, however, they must concentrate a wider product range in fewer mills
(Fujitani 1995).
                                         
11 For contrary views on constant downward price pressures on steel producers, see Tilton (1999) & Ostrom
(1996).
12 In 1998 Nikko’s Mr. Harada (1998a) expected 1998 steel demand to be 95 million tons down from 102,8
million in 1997.  Also, he expected exports to the US to fall due to a stronger Yen and US anti-dumping
pressures.
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Given this combination of factors, it is hardly surprising that steel producers have
turned to other opportunities and activities to try to develop new, more profitable
business.  Included among these are non-steel products such as semiconductors,
engineering, and even amusement parks.  Indeed, this focus on new products and
businesses has led steel producers into both acquisitions and affiliations (NSC 1997a,
NSC 1997 and Fujitani 1995).  Some of these examples are: NSC’s Singapore-based
semiconductor JV with Hitachi, Sumitomo Metal Electronic Device’s JV with Read-Rite,
and Kawasaki’s investment in LSI Logic Japan.  Indeed, all five producers have
semiconductor divisions (Harada 1998a).  Their performance, however, has been affected
by fluctuations in both DRAM demand and exchange rates (Nagai 1998 and Yoshida
1997).  Like steel, DRAM production is just another globally competitive cyclical
business, where profitability is subject to exchange rates.  Thus it is not clear that this or
other diversifications have been so successful (Nomura 1998 and Ostrom 1996); nor have
these new activities reduced exchange rate exposure.  Moreover, after several years, steel
remains overwhelmingly the large Japanese integrated steel producers’ basic business,
either directly or indirectly, via engineering, or in the case of NKK, ships as well
(Appendix II).
Recognizing this situation, Japanese integrated steel producers have tried to raise
the value-added in their products (Ostrom 1996).  They have also participated in the
global proliferation of new steel capacity and the emergence of new competitors, through
a wide range of acquisitions and affiliations, and by selling engineering services (A, F &
G 1996).  Ventures in the US alone include 3.5 million tons of galvanizing and coating
plants, such as Kawasaki and Armco’s 50/50 operations, NSC’s two plants with Inland,
17
Sumitomo’s two 40/60 facilities with LTV, Kobe Steel’s with USC, Nisshin’s two 64/36
operations with Wheeling Pittsburgh, and NKK’s JV plant with DOFASCO (Fujitani
1995).  More specifically with respect to NSC, in addition to its relationship with Inland,
it directly participates in steel making ventures in China, Thailand, and Malaysia (NSC
1997a).  It also announced in March ’99 that it would be purchasing a 33.8% stake in
POSCO [Pohang Steel] (Goldman Sachs Japan Research 1999).
However, as just explained and illustrated in the above examples, almost all the
large integrated steel producers have sought similar solutions. Given the same business
and economic environment, they have responded similarly in terms of geographic or
business diversification possibilities, and to trade pressures and cost reduction initiatives
(Harada 1998a and Ostrom 1996).  Thus the latest round of announced and prospective
rationalizations will once again raise the issue of tit-for-tat cost benefits that will be
quickly competed away as has happened before (Appendix II).13  It is for this reason that
                                         
13 In 1995 Mr. Fujitani (1995) of NKK noted that all “the five major Japanese steel companies have
targeted cost reductions totaling 930 billion yen in 3 years from 1994.  (NKK’s target is 175 billion yen).
Cost reduction measures include first, reduction of employees eliminating multi-layer management (about
25,000 employees) through a 25% cutback of white collar and 20% cutback of blue collar employees
relying on substantial incentives for early retirement and relocation to subsidiaries: second, cutback of
capital investment to 30-40 % of traditional investment; third, drastic reconsolidation of manufacturing
plants; and fourth, reconstruction or readjustment of diversified businesses and more concentration on core
businesses.”  Similarly NSC reported in its 1997 Annual Report (NSC 1997) that during its third Medium
Term Business Plan for FY 1994-1996,  it reduced annual steel division costs by 300 billion Yen.  In
addition, during 1996 it implemented “a new strategy designed to precisely respond to market trends under
a single, unified system integrating by product, the whole of manufacturing, marketing and research and
development resources.”
These cost reduction strategies take account of the “multipart” process noted by Ostrom (1996).  “In an
integrated plant iron ore goes in one end of the mill, and finished steel products come out the other.  Hence,
steel makers need a variety of raw and intermediate materials, such as iron ore or steel scrap, as inputs.  In
Japan these account for three-quarters of the cost of producing a ton of steel.  At least for an integrated
plant, steel companies also need massive amounts of capital.  A plant with an annual capacity of 3 million
metric tons of crude steel requires around $5 billion in capital; this accounts for about half of the remaining
cost of production.  By contrast, labor costs are relatively modest and comprise about one-third the costs
net of raw materials and intermediate inputs.  The 10 percent share of total costs accounted for by labor in
the steel industry contrasts with the 25 percent share paid to labor in the case of labor-intensive industries,
such as precision instruments.”
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NSC recognized in 1996 that another strategic approach was required to address the
cyclical nature of the industry, the increase in global cost-based competition, and periodic
excess capacity.  Otherwise, the firm’s major business and the company would continue
to be a toy of exchange rate fluctuations and global economic fluctuations (Harada 1998a
and Fujitani 1995).
Therefore, the strategic problem in integrated steel, as in many other are s,
remains how to differentiate one’s product and services, including new ones, from those
offered by competitors, while creating a lasting competitive edge in an increasingly
competitive environment, both domestically and overseas.  This strategic issue is
especially critical in steel, given even more competition for the available markets from
expanding competitors.  These competitors (can) include mini mills in the US and Japan,
such as Nucor and Tokyo Steel, or new integrated mills in the NICs, such as one recently
announced for Malaysia.  The competitive field is therefore increasingly crowded with
Japanese and foreign firms of every description.  Nevertheless, if one can succeed in the
objective of efficiently selling existing and new customers a wider range of specialized or
custom products, then cash flow should improve as sales and earnings increase.  This is
the key strategic issue NSC has been facing.  Their solution has been to develop a
customized production and marketing strategy that can efficiently offer customers such
an expanded and customized range of product and service options.
Historically, and currently, under the guidance of MITI (Ministry of International
Trade and Industry), the Japanese steel industry has done many things cooperatively
(Ostrom 1996; A, F & G 1996), including sharing new technologies (e.g. continuous
casting) or negotiating coal contracts (e.g. with Australia) [O’Brien 1992].  In addition,
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all domestic orders for both product and raw materials are handled through the Japanese
trading companies.  This is because as O’Brien (1992) explains, “the over-riding
principle guiding MITI’s policies was that to succeed internationally, the industry had to
minimize its manufacturing costs.  To do this required large scale plants, high throughput
and modern technology.”  But this kind of overlap and industry integration has
complicated NSC’s strategic problem as a single firm: differentiating its products and
services from its Japanese competitors’ in terms of kind, quality, or price in a way that
cannot easily be replicated (footnote 9).
Nippon Steel’s Multi-faceted Steel Strategy
NSC is very much a part of this competitive and economic environment.  While
its financial situation remains strong (Appendix II) with 1998 revenues of about 3 trillion
Yen and operating earnings of 180 billion Yen, it has still suffered from stagnant sales for
several years.  Further, though its free cash flow is among the best for global producers, it
has experienced wide fluctuation in pretax and after tax income.  In addition, it has been
forced to draw down its hidden stock reserves to cover periodic operating losses
(Appendix II).  As a result, NSC has not been able to translate its larger market share and
operating efficiencies into a meaningful and long-term strategic benefit (in terms of man
hours and expenses per ton relative to other Japanese producers as well as compared to
several large foreign producers (Nomura 1998)).
NSC thus recognized about 5 years ago that it needed to develop a new strategic
initiative.  The needs were to reverse and improve the downward price and stagnant
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demand trends in its steel business as well as to safeguard against the emerging
competitive developments.14   Further, given the evolving economic and competitive
context for steel companies explained above, this strategy had to address certain
fundamental conditions.  It had to use NSC’s existing steel making capacity; it had to
accept the existing relationships with the trading companies and other Japanese or foreign
steel producers; and it had to establish a competitive advantage relative to other
producers.  The strategy NSC has developed appears to meet these conditions and
depends on three basic aspects of its business.
One is its diversified steel making capacity and trained labor force.  The second is
its new e-commerce and customized casting marketing and production strategy, and the
third is its sophisticated use of IT to economically rationalize and manage production and
inventories.  Though it is very difficult, NSC makes a particular effort to manage and
analyze the complex information related to all aspects of its business.  It is able to
differentiate its products and client support from competitors’, and to retain its customers
and product/market competitiveness on a long-term basis.  It has coupled this approach
with an effort to integrate sophisticated data management at the order and corporate level
(order allocation and accounting) with an IT system that also links the head office (HO)
                                         
14 Major Steel Products – Out of a 103 million tons of steel products produced in Japan in 1995 and 1996,
about 93 million ended as finished steel, split between ordinary (78 MM tons) and specialty (15 MM tones)
products.  (The total included finished exports of about 22-24 MM tons.)  About 53 million tons was hot
and cold rolled products, including plates and sheets (coated, finished and uncoated).  Both domestically
and for export, automobiles are the largest user of high quality sheet followed by appliance makers.  NSC’s
domestic share of the 11 major Japanese car manufacturers is 40% and of the 8 major appliance makers
44%.  It also has about 38% of Japan’s capacity to produce these products (NSC 1997a and Harada 1998).
This is more than twice the next largest producer, NKK and 50% more than its share of total Japanese steel
production.  Out of NSC’s total steel sales in 1996 of 1.7 trillion Yen, 1.1 trillion Yen were flat-rolled
products (NSC 1997a).  Therefore, NSC’s strategy of concentrating on areas such as appliances and
automobiles through customized casting and e-commerce appears to be one that enhances its position in a
market where it has a strong existing competency.  This is consistent with Ahlbrandt et al’s view that all
steel producers in “today’s steel market” can only succeed by choosing “markets where they believed it
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strategy with the production management system that enhances the productivity of each
mill.  The object is to improve customer service, NSC’s pricing policies, and its
production flexibility.  In this manner, NSC is using IT to achieve a result that meets its
strategic business goals for its all-important steel business.15
One outcome of the global proliferation of steel products’ users and providers has
been that the relatively simple structure of Japan’s steel industry is changing rapidly from
the consumers’ and producers’ viewpoints.  Previously, if you wanted to buy steel from a
Japanese producer you placed the order for a standard steel product through a Japanese
TC.  They placed the order with a steel producer, and the steel was shipped to either a
domestic or export location.  As explained by Tokyo Steel, for many standard products
such as construction rebar, this system continues today.  For each standard product
option, there is in fact a clear set of suppliers (Harada 1998).  However, for many other
products, such as the wire used in a bridge (Fortune 1998) or the sheet used in many
automobiles and appliances (NSC 1997a and NSC 1997), the quality or product produced
is made to customer specifications, a more customized approach.  While naturally there
has always been some product customization for particular projects, this has generally
been on a case-by-case basis due to higher cost compared to buying the off-the-shelf
predetermined industry standard.  This is the tailor-made suit versus ready-made suit
                                                                                                                   
was possible to create and sustain a competitive advantage” and by using “technology to help secure and
maintain market position.”
15 NSC’s new strategy initiated in 1993 is well articulated in a report from Nomura (1998).  Here the
analyst notes that Mr. Imai, NSC’s president, “would not tolerate any more loss of market share for crude
steel and that there would be no more temporary shutdowns of production facilities;...its primary goal in the
steel business to be operational at full capacity, rather than an ability to withstand production cuts...Second,
Mr. Imai instituted a system of product-specific cost management.  Steel materials were divided in 59
separate types, with costs managed on the basis of a matrix system that also tracks total costs at each of the
company’s 10 mills.  The system also enables management to keep abreast of the cost-earnings situation for
individual orders.  Third, division managers were given more responsibility.  Previously, major decisions
22
paradigm that is firmly entrenched in the mass-production revolution that transformed the
world economy during the 20th Century.  What NSC’s strategy aims to do is to bring the
steel business within the lean-production paradigm and then extend it into the emerging
controlled production paradigm.  The difference between this “Custom Made” approach
and that used by other steel producers is presented in ENICOM’s Briefing (1998a).  It
specifies that NSC’s “all customer support” leads to “more frequent status reports, on-
time delivery and more categorized products” that improve customer satisfaction.
Conversely, Tokyo Steel’s “commercial usage” is for “ready made sales.”  But given the
“Data Explosion” that is a direct function of the former strategy, NSC could only
accomplish it through an “integrated, multi-layer customized system.”
Under the original mass-production paradigm, Henry Ford said one could have
any color car one wanted as long as it was black.  Nothing would disturb his totally
integrated production system.  Sloan and GM then established how a firm could achieve
economies of scale through common parts and platforms but still deliver greater variety.
This is currently where most world steel producers are situated.  They can provide a wide
variety, indeed thousands, of standard steel products by making a common material and
then processing it into a product that can be inventoried in response to expected demand.
About 35 years ago a new production paradigm – lean production – was developed by
Toyota.  Originally conceived for automobiles, lean production was then extended to
other assembly-based manufacturing, lean production (Womack, Jones, and Roos 1990).
Using lean production techniques Toyota and other manufacturers have shown
that a firm can produce an infinite variety of products on the same assembly line with no
                                                                                                                   
had been left to senior management... The company has set its sights on gradually increasing its share of the
steel market, strengthening its balance sheet, and spinning off businesses.”
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loss of efficiency.  Indeed, one problem lean producers faced in the early 1990s was that
the very power of the system to produce such variety costlessly led firms to offer the
consumer too many options.  This then became an inventory and timely replacement
problem.  Lean producers have thus voluntarily reduced the number of options or degree
of customization offered.  However, because lean production does tie production directly
to consumer demand, it is inherently cheaper and better meets customer needs.  It has
therefore become the dominant manufacturing paradigm in autos and similar industries
such as appliances.
NSC would no like to apply this strategy to steel in two ways.  The first is to offer
and respond to customer demand for more customized steel products (tailored to a
particular end use or customer product design) without the cost premium that would have
previously been required.  Secondly, it would like to become part of lean producers’
design, just-in-time, consumer-driven production paradigm (Womack, Jones, and Roos
1992).  An obvious potential example of this would be having specific steel sheets
tailored to a particular model car of appliance.  This would mean Japan’s steel users and
NSC would work together at the customer’s product design stage.  NSC would then
become an integral part of that customer’s production system.  If we use an example,
such as Toyota’s JIT production, we can see how the requirements needed to meet these
objectives are, in turn, driving several aspects of NSC’s evolving strategic initiative.
One.  NSC must explain the benefits of its customized casting e-commerce
approach to new products as compared to those being provided by the alternative
standard product providers.  Two.  NSC must significantly reduce its product delivery
and cycle times for such products, if JIT delivery needs are not to escalate in-process and
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finished inventories.  Three.  Customers must be able to track their JIT orders so there is
no disruption to the clients’ own finely-tuned production schedules.  Four.  NSC needs a
sophisticated accounting system that can accurately assess the cost of mass producing
such customized products.  Five.  NSC must have a way to allocate production of the
increased product variety between and within mills.  Six.  Inventories of replacement-part
steel for such customized end products and uses must be controlled and competitively,
but accurately, priced.  Seven.  Customization should add value or reduce customer costs
as a trade-off for price stability and a single source supplier, as has been true for auto
parts suppliers (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990).
It is with such factors in mind that NSC set out five years ago to develop its E-
commerce, customized casting, and product accounting systems.  It then combined these
with a flexible IT managed production system that would permit it to deliver customized
products as cost effectively as the traditional approach of producing to a predetermined
set of industry standards.  Thus, the primary strategic drivers have been the customers’
demand for more tailored steel products at a low cost similar to their own ability to
produce variety at no extra cost.  Further, it is in terms of these goals that NSC has
developed criteria for selecting software and measuring the success of its IT systems. 
As NSC has developed its plans to offer greater variety and customized products
at little or no premium, its goal has been to determined how it can best produce these
products while rationalizing its existing mill capacity.  This means efficiently producing a
larger product variety in fewer mills.  It would also like to do this in a way that retains
and expands its customer base so competitors cannot just take the business away on the
basis of price.  So a critical aspect of management’s strategic thinking is to build
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sustainable competitive barriers between customers and the wider competition, based on
NSC’s core competencies.  Only in this way can it maintain profitability and avoid the
global “excessive” competition (Rapp 1999) typical of this cyclical industry.  It will also
help them in dealing with US dumping allegations since customized products will be less
easy to categorize and will be less subject to price pressures, especially if those products
are tied to large customers’ JIT production systems.
NSC’s strategic solution has been the e-commerce customized production model
incorporated into a continuous order-to-product delivery system.  The stated strategic
aims in implementing the new system are to automate and rationalize the order and mill
production allocation system.  Simultaneously, the goal is to become more involved with
its largest customers’ evolving and growing set of steel requirements that change with
clients’ new product developments or model changes.  The key for NSC is tracking and
being involved in these changing needs by individual customers.  This can be effected by
becoming part of the design process and then producing and delivering the appropriate
steel products while developing and changing the steel in ways that are responsive to
advances in steel making technology (including using IT) and its customers’ evolving
requirements.  Further, NSC needs to know how valuable customized production is for
particular customers and, therefore, how easily it can retain them on a long-term basis.
For example, if lighter corrosion resistant steel reduces warranty claims and helps auto
firms meet fleet mileage requirements, then this steel will add value that will more than
compensate for a higher price and customization.  Further, if NSC can reduce delivery
times, it can better meet JIT requirements.  Knowing the most effective way to market
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and deliver its customized product capabilities involves complex issues that vary by
product and customer group, requiring thought and data.
Since NSC is very conscious of the expense of producing and delivering its
products to different customers, it has developed, as part of its strategy, a new accounting
system to identify fairly specifically different customer groups and the particular costs of
delivering any product to them.  These categories are not broad, such as all auto
producers or even just Toyota, but are well-defined with respect to a given steel in a
specific quantity delivered to a certain plant or subcontractor.  However, because NSC
still relies on the TCs for orders, its approach is somewhat different from a normal parts
supplier that might be part of Toyota’s keiretsu (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990).
Nevertheless, NSC closely analyzes the production and delivery costs for an individual
product to try identify the best production approach, first by plant and then by schedule
within each plant.  In this way it expects to couple the E-commerce software system with
NSC’s new internal accounting system and optimum production allocation system to
lower steel production costs for the firm as a whole.  This is a kind of iterative expert
system based on an analysis of its own “best practice” operations.
At the same time, NSC recognizes that its leading customers are being targeted by
other competitors.  So competition for such customer business will continue to be fierce.
Indeed, this is a primary driver for the new customized product approach.  But for the
strategy to be effective, NSC must gather and manage a wide range of information about
its clients and potential customers so it can offer them customized products in a timely
and cost-effective manner.  Making the strategy work, therefore, requires NSC to
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efficiently track its large customer base and huge order volume in terms of individual
needs, and then to deliver products to that base efficiently and profitably.
As already explained, NSC has spent considerable effort in evaluating costs and
also in increasing productivity.  Indeed, it believes its new strategic approach is good at
combining cost containment with revenue enhancement.  Further, NSC’s management
recognizes that this approach has become even more important as old and new
competitors add new steel making capacity.  (See footnote 15 and Appendix II.)  This is
because increased competition will put pressure on prices globally, especially when
economic activity is depressed.  So it has become very important to target customers with
specific product needs that are not easily matched with current standardized
specifications.
A critical aspect of NSC’s approach to this situation has been to increase the
independence of its mills through IT by incorporating most of what the customer and
head office (HO) need to know in the E-commerce and new accounting systems (Dazai
1997 and ENICOM 1998).  This includes direct links to the central information system.
The basic information infrastructure for allocating production is controlled by HO, which
now considers the total cost of producing and delivering a product in deciding mill
allocations.  Previously, the allocation was based on a given mill being identified with a
particular set of products.  However, as more production is now concentrated in fewer
mills that can produce a wider variety of products, this process is much more complex
than before.  In effect, each mill’s cost of producing and delivering an order for a
particular customer must be assessed in advance, using the new accounting system while
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optimizing total mill usage.  In this way NSC’s sophisticated IT system works to allocate
orders and control costs.
Further, as the new IT system is constantly being revised based on the observed
“best practice” of its mills, the system is constantly improving the consistency,
performance, and productivity of the mills and NSC’s overall production efficiency.  In
practice, based on HO’s allocation analysis, each mill receives orders from HO that have
been sent by the TCs.  Under the new E-commerce system, this will all be done in a
common, preformatted manner compared to the old system using individualized faxes.
These e-orders incorporate all aspects of the steel order, including the appropriate
delivery schedule and location (Dazai 1997).  The client, in turn, is able to immediately
track the order elect4ronically, as it moves through NSC’s production system, so that
they do not need to call or contact any individuals at NSC (Dazai & Maruyama 1997).
The customer can therefore know where various products are in the supply
pipeline and the expected delivery dates.  Prior to launch, the system was extensively
piloted with the major Japanese appliance producers and the trading companies to assure
that both steel producers and customers could easily understand and respond to its
nuances (Dazai 1997 and Dazai & Maruyama 1997).  This is because the system’s
effectiveness depends on a symbiotic integration of steel producer, trading company, and
user.  Once an order is made, NSC’s HO sends it electronically to the designated mill that
they have selected based on their cost assessment using the new accounting system.  Thus
through direct marketing and electronic means, NSC has found it can build a structure
that will support a long-term customized customer relationship.  So far the system has
improved not only product delivery but has also lowered costs.  The system achieves
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these results by: simplifying deskwork and order tracking; reducing and speeding
paperwork; eliminating redundant inputs (faxes); confirming and allocating the order at
its inception; and by adding value through supporting each mill’s optimal functioning.
This simplification and improved data processing also extends to after-sales services,
such as invoicing, account management, and inventory control for replacement part steel
(Dazai & Maruyama).
Because the newly trained sales-force and automated support system are cost
intensive (Dazai & Maruyama 1997), the costs are subject to user-base economics (Rapp
May 1997 and Gurley 1998).  That is, each additional user reduces the cost of delivering
products to others by spreading the fixed systems costs over more and more users.  This
favors e-commerce between large enterprises first, with smaller firms becoming
associated later, though they must yield first-mover advantages to the bigger enterprises.
Success in this area is thus subject to a beneficial loop of increasing returns and greater
profits.  A clear indication of the benefits to the NSC of this strategy has been its ability
to close some of its mills and further reduce staff without any loss in efficiency or
production capabilities.  This should give it significant cost and operating profit
advantages at a time when corporate earnings and revenues are under pressures
(Appendix II).  Importantly, the steel analyst at Nikko was aware of what NSC was doing
in terms of E-commerce, IT, and the accounting-based mill allocation system, and felt
that such efforts definitely improved NSC’s competitive situation (Appendix II).
NSC’s management’s approach is dynamic in that they are constantly adding to
the number of products and services the mills can deliver, as well as to the required IT
support.  This is part of the constant strategic upgrading and development of the
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company'’ IT and steel production system that has allowed it to increasingly shift towards
higher grade steels and now more customized products (ENICOM 1998a).  The driving
basic decision criterion, in this respect, has been to: enhance the mills' capabilities with
systems and machines, expanding the capacity of the system and reducing costs, all
through extending the use of electronics and in turn mill capacity (NSC 1997a).
Management always keeps in mind NSC’s customers’ various and shifting needs,
so those customers feel helped by the shift towards more tailored products and the new E-
commerce ordering system.  This was one reason for the extensive piloting of the system
before its launch (Dazai 1997 and ENICOM 1998a).  It is also one of the reasons why
they have continued to modify it, since its introduction, according to trading company
and customer feedback.  The objective is to make the sales approach more congenial and
user friendly, while getting the customer to accept the e-commerce approach to doing
business, since this means clients (other than appliance makers) will use it for their
orders.  This is critical since NSC’s strategic success depends on clients appreciating the
system’s benefits and expanding the user base.  One clear advantage is that it is now
easier for NSC to deliver products produced by joint-ventures or affiliates.
Information Technology Infrastructure and Project Selection
NSC’s basis information system is a typical Japanese “three-tier” mainframe
system similar to most other large Japanese companies (Rapp 1995 and ENICOM
1998).16  The mainframes manage a series of servers that manage the PCs and
                                         
16  The mainframe (IBM) controls servers that control the networking system and communicate with each
mill and its equipment.  The mainframe has the task of scheduling production and operations as well as
31
workstations.17  In addition, because it is a real time on-line system, it has been totally
integrated with NSC’s own business operations, as is typical of most large Japanese
firms.  But NSC’s customized mainframe system is large, even by Japanese stands,
involving over three billion lines of code (Rapp 1995).  It is completely managed and
maintained by ENICOM.  Internal communication depends on NSC’s own fiber optic
system and its own customized middleware that provides the interface or bridge between
different users within NSC.
In addition to reducing paperwork, the improved systems and communications
have facilitated order tracking and processing, improving customer satisfaction.  The
clear objectives of speeding communication, improving mill productivity, and increasing
client satisfaction have enabled NSC to select, develop, and use the software required for
each function, and to integrate it into the support system.  This is because it is relatively
easy to measure whether these objectives have been achieved.  Except for the operating
systems, NSC has generally developed all its own software and IT systems.  About 150
                                                                                                                   
tracking orders.  The next system project is how to use the accumulated information to improve the system
and its competitive impact.
17 NSC uses a client server system but the client servers are 70% mainframe, though physically the
mainframes are getting smaller as is the disc-storage space.  These can now store 100 gigabytes of storage
in a fairly small box.  NSC’s system has 1.3 billion lines of execution code and the total lines in the system
might be twice that.  So this is a huge system.  In turn, each plant has its own IT systems division since
each plant has its own unique operation in terms of what it is producing and the capacity it has to produce
it.  In fact each plant decides it own actual production once it has been assigned orders by head office.  So
how much each plant produces is related to these assigned sales.  On the map received from the HO each
black dot is a steel mill and the triangles are offices.  This means there are many many syste s within the
overall system and most of these are IBM.  But NSC also has several UNIX based workstation systems,
and many employees also have personal computers that are using Windows and Windows NT.  Altogether
the HO systems group has 8000 clients within the company.
The main issues for all these systems, particularly those related to production, is that steel plants must
operate continuously: 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 52 weeks a year with no real shutdown (O’Brien 1992
and A, F & G 1996).  Thus at the Kimitsu works NSC has  fault tolerant Tandem computer to insure
continuous operation.  The process begins with the flow of orders coming from the trading companies.
These companies track their major customers’ inventories, production requirements, etc., and place the
orders with the steel companies for a certain kind of steel.  Traditionally these orders have come into head
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people are working in its internal Information Systems Division and another 2,400 in its
captive software subsidiary ENICOM.  Most of its EDP needs are purchased from
ENICOM, and these purchases account for about 50% of ENICOM’s revenues (footnote
20).
Outline of Systems Use at NSC18
Everything starts with demand (juchu) and the orders from the trading companies
that are given requests by their related keiretsu firms’ demand for steel.  This is NSC’s
demand network.  The PP or Production Program (SW system) is designed to support this
demand.  The Head Office (HO) Administration or (Honsha-kei) decides what systems
are best to use within the HO and the company as a whole.  The plants decide what is best
within each plant to support that plant’s particular production system and especially SW
related to controlling specific equipment.  So, in fact, there are a series of separate
systems whose procurement and development are decided by different people but which
are close to the software’s actual use.  NSC’s head office financial system keeps track of
the results determined by the data emerging from these basic systems.  All the systems
are interrelated, so that even though overall it is complex, it is still integrated.  The order
receiving system is probably the most complex within the overall system.
As the steel orders come from the network of Trading Companies (TCs) to HO, it
is HO that is responsible for its design.  Using this system, the computer decides which
mill should produce the order.  Since all equipment is automated, delivery and shipment
                                                                                                                   
office by fax.  They are then assigned to each mill based primarily on geography but also on capacity and
ability to produce.  So as of 1998 the new automated order system was just coming on-line.
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are included in this determination.  The financial system relates the material and
equipment used to produce the steel in order to calculate the cost of production, shipment,
and delivery.  So the whole order is assessed in advance, from order through shipment
and delivery.  While there is some human input as it relates to personnel and NSC’s
personnel system, the raw material purchasing and equipment usage/maintenance are all
done by the computer.  ENICOM, NSC’s totally owned IT subsidiary, is the one that has
developed this total system and the related software.  Modific tions and additions to the
system are decided by HO and each mill according to their individual areas of
responsibility, i.e., core competencies.  At the plant level, the mill manager can make this
decision unless the new system or change is very large or could impact the whole system.
Then it must come to HO.  Thus, control depends on size, amount, and impact.
HO has responsibility for all changes and systems relating to sales or financial
issues.  Even within the Head Office group, though, there are limits to budget authority.
The General Manager of the group can decide up to a limited certain amount.  Above that
amount, the decision goes to the Managing Director in charge of systems and information
technology, and, if it is a very big amount and has an impact on the entire corporation,
then it may have to be decided by the President.  These latter situations are very rare, but
one example is the new corporate-wide accounting system that NSC is using to determine
the cost of alternative production options.  Another example is the already described on-
line E-Commerce ordering system involving the trading companies.  This latter system is
very complex and involves all aspects of NSC’s steel production, including sales, orders,
receivables, HO finance, accounting, personnel assignments, and purchasing.  Purchasing
                                                                                                                   
18 Based on briefings with Nippon Steel’s Head Office (HO) Systems Group and ENICOM July 1998.
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is divided into materials, equipment, and payables including third party expenses, like
paper and office supplies.
The HO IT group’s interaction with ENICOM is on several levels since they are
administering the overall ENICOM relationship, including monitoring the interaction
between ENICOM’s regional offices and the mills.  At the same time, this group works
directly with ENICOM on certain projects like the new accounting system.  In all cases,
NSC assigns both a budget to the project and a project team.  That is, ENICOM never
works in isolation from NSC, ENICOM in turn assigns its teams as well in consultation
with NSC.  The group at head office then checks with the project team periodically to
make sure it is on track.  Then, when the projects gets to the point where it is ready to
proceed, HO first checks and tests the new SW’s implementation on a trial basis, before it
is actually incorporated in to the overall system, since NSC does not want any crashes.  If
the budget is over-run, then this is the responsibility of the general project leader who
comes from NSC, the user side.  ENICOM is only providing technical systems expertise
and is not responsible for the entire project.  This remains with NSC.  Such over-runs do
not just happen in a vacuum since the HO group requires regular progress and budget
reports at least once a month in order to monitor the project’s progress.  If a project is
behind schedule or is over budget, the HO group looks for the reason and whether it is the
responsibility of NSC (the user) or ENICOM.  The HO IT group then talks to the user or
ENICOM, as appropriate.
If the problem is with ENICOM, HO does not get involv d except as to identify
the problem.  The HO IT group looks to ENICOM to solve its own issues on the
computer side.  This is ENICOM’s area of expertise and responsibility.  To this extent,
35
ENICOM operates separately and independently of NSC, even though it is a wholly
owned subsidiary (Appendix II).  Currently, the HO group has some small projects on
which they are working and a very small number of large specific projects, such as the
new cost accounting system.  They have tried to do a few BPRs (Business Process
Reengineering) within the financial division, but are not doing any now.  (The case writer
received the impression these efforts had not worked well.)
In reality, during 1998, the new accounting system absorbed most of the HO IT
group’s time and effort.  This is a very complex and expensive effort (several billion
Yen), since before, each mill had its own system, whereas now, NSC is trying to apply a
common standard to all mills.  The purpose of this is to enable HO to assess each mill’s
cost of producing and delivering various products on a comparative basis.  As all 10 mills
will change to the new system simultaneously, this is a big effort involving the entire
steel making operation and HO.  There are two main components to the system.   One is a
“parent-only” system, and the other is an internal accounting system.  Both are operated
by ENICOM for NSC.  Each mill has its own computer managing this system with the
main computer at ENICOM’s office.  NSC leases a high-speed line from NTT to connect
ENICOM with each mill and the sales offices.  (ENICOM actually is the one leasing and
it, in turn, provides a lease to NSC.)  NSC HO has its own line that is connected directly
to ENICOM.  The whole operation is viewed as a VAN (Value Added Network) by MPT
and is thus classified as a second class telecommunications carrier.
NSC’s e-mail or (Shanai) inside the company uses this VAN system, as does its
internal website.  However, company personnel use the Internet for news and external e-
mail, and the external web-page is what provides information to people who want to
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assess the company externally.  This separation is due to security issues and not everyone
inside the company has access to the internal website or home page.  To try to upgrade
the integrity of the system.  NSC has just bought a new security handbook.  However,
from a total corporate perspective, the biggest issue facing the firm is actually steel
production consolidation in fewer mills.  This, in turn, is forcing the integration of
production, accounting, and purchasing that has previously existed as separate systems.
When each mill was associated with a particular set of products, each one had its own IT
system.  But, consolidation means fewer mills produce more products with more complex
specifications.  This is forcing NSC to replace the system that has been working well for
ten years.  This decision has technological and eventual cost merit, but is still very
expensive.
Such complex, expensive systems are why the HO IT group together with oth r
IT groups and ENICOM follow a specific procedure when introducing a new system,
whether for the company, a mill, or a function.  First they specify the proposed merit of
introducing the system or change.  This is on a case-by-case ad hoc basis and is promoted
by the users within NSC to meet a specific current or expected need.  The HO systems
group or ENICOM do not introduce it.  Once the real benefit has been determined, the
HO group creates a special team to develop and manage the introduction of the new
system.  (This is not a special procedure but is the procedure as each case arises.)  As
noted above, this includes ENICOM and the user’s group.  These groups then determine a
work program and a proposed budget.  If it is a big project with a big budget, they create
a special review committee that includes an NSC director who will judge, usually on a
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quantitative but sometimes qualitative basis, whether the project’s merits justify the
budget expense.
It is this approach that has resulted in several major business improvements
through the use of IT.  NSC has gotten better at projecting demand through a bottom-up
(micro) rather than top down (macro) approach.  Before it estimated economic growth
and how much steel was likely to be demanded.  But given the need to produce a wide
range of customized products, management recognized they had to do a better job of
forecasting specific user demands to estimate the effect on certain equipment and mill
capacity.  So better networking with users was required, especially if NSC was going to
have to adopt improved JIT interfaces without over-expanding inventories.  Furthermore,
since the collapse of Japan's bubble economy affected various industries differently and,
even within industries, affected specific products differently, NSC needed to be more
attuned to such demand differences.  (An example of this is that the steel demand related
to Lexuses and Landcruisers has been different from the demand for Corollas).
This is when NSC began to negotiate with the car and TCs to develop better steel
demand forecasts and ordering systems.  Sheet inventories for automobiles and
replacement parts have been particularly critical in this regard.  Yet, NSC could not just
push this issue on to the TCs, even though they are the only channel to the steel
companies for physical delivery and so handle the buffer stocks.  This is because shifting
inventories do nothing to reduce the overall delivered cost of the product.  Further, TCs
are just service companies that do not forecast but, rather, meet specified customer
requirements as they exist.  Therefore, to change the system, NSC had to work with the
auto companies directly to estimate the actual new production and replacement parts
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demand for cars.  The objective was to reduce the steel inventories required for each car
and part type.  This it can now do using a sophisticated IT model and database.19
Implementation of E-Commerce and Customized Casting Strategy
In July 1998 the Sloan study team received a briefing at the Kimitsu works on he
introduction of NSC's new e-commerce strategy and its implementation in terms of
customized casting.  At that time, NSC's management reported that they had developed
100% of the system themselves along with ENICOM NSC's captive subsidiary.  They did
note some client-related issues, however, concerning the new system and security.
Furthermore, these issues will become more of a problem as the company uses the
Internet more for e-commerce and other purposes, potentially exposing its database to
unauthorized access. Already with 20,000 employees access to the corporate database is a
difficult situation for both the firm and the employees since the latter need information
(data) about NSC’s customers and orders to do their work.20 S curity and authorized
access will multiply when clients and suppliers need information on the database too.
                                         
19 In the case of the US, SW transactions are usually handled directly with the end buyer and the systems
group is not involved. This is also true of the relation with Inland, though NSC, ENICOM and Inland do
consult on systems usage.
20 Mr. Kawanami, ENICOM’s Managing Director, originally joined NSC and became part of its Systems
Corporation that had 200 people. Now it has 70. People coming into ENICOM who are assigned to the
Nippon Steel account (about 50% of ENICOM’s business) have to learn about steel, including steel-making
technology, the different products and NSC. When ENICOM sets up a project with NSC, it is at NSC’s
request. That is, someone at NSC asks for systems support. ENICOM and NSC then address this issue
together as a joint effort. ENICOM does not just go in, get information about the project, and come back
later with a program. This is because on every project there is a steel technology component, an IT
component, and a NSC business component. These are never completely and clearly separated. Therefore,
it is not possible for ENICOM to do its IT piece in isolation from NSC. The overall strategic vision
directing ENICOM’s relation to NSC became clarified as the team learned more about ENICOM, other IT
projects and the driving forces behind customized casting. In terms of projects, ENICOM has two ways of
organizing relative to NSC. One, it has groups at the job sites that work directly with those producing the
steel. In this case, the ENICOM people join the steel mill conferences. Two, it can produce new systems to
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E-Commerce System21
At the time NSC undertook the new E-commerce initiative, steel-making IT was
still very customized at each plant because since they produced different product groups,
the associated systems were different.  Steel production is not like auto assembly where
                                                                                                                   
order such as the accounting system it is developing using Oracle. As noted above, the latter type projects
are sometimes ordered separately from the business or operating unit by the IT unit at head office. NSC’s
Corporate EI (Electronic Information) Division is composed of the following: Planning & Coordination,
Industrial System Solutions, Financial System Solutions, Public Sector System Solutions, Network System
Solutions and System Research & Development Center.
NSC established ENICOM in 1988 as a separate company from the IT division, and it currently has 2185
employees, about half of whom work on NSC-related projects. In steel related areas, it only works for NSC,
but it has clients in other areas such as pharmaceuticals and chemicals, e.g. Takeda is a client. It also has an
electronics business unit in Shinjuku with 600 people and does work for Matsushita and Daiei. It also has
small manufacturing companies as clients. This is one way to reduce the cost of maintaining this captive IT
operation, and it seems to have worked. In 1988, virtually 99% of ENICOM’s revenues were from NSC,
whereas in 1997 out of total revenues of ¥83 billion, billings to NSC were only 37%. However, because it
only charges NSC on a cost basis, this somewhat depresses NSC’s percentage of ENICOM’s total business
in terms of people and resources. Because other steel companies’ captive IT firms often charge their parents
a profit, their sales are usually about 60-70% steel related. ENICOM’s systems operation has 1000 people.
ENICOM’s main departments are: Planning & Administration, R&D, Project Auditing, Solution Business,
Network Business, Steel-making Systems and its 14 regional offices (ENICOM 1998). In addition, it has
28 access points, 10 computer centers and a 4300 km high speed network in Japan.
21 J. William Gurley (1998) has an excellent analysis of the criteria needed to establish a strategically
effective e-commerce system.  He notes such a system must address both industry and IT issues.  More
specifically he stresses that "the companies that will do well…are the ones that take the time to understand
the context of the industry in which they operate.  Rather than aggregate technology, they must aggregate
context."  For this reason, "the home-run opportunities belong to companies with people who deeply
understand how a particular industry works: who understand how the Internet as a channel can serve that
industry.  These companies will build Websites that aggregate buyers and sellers to help facilitate both the
decision-making process and the subsequent delivery of products or services.  Kevin Jones of Interactive
Week calls these butterfly businesses, because if you draw a picture of a service that aggregates buyers and
sellers, it involves two triangles pointing inward at the single Web source.'  Gurley "prefers to call these
sites vortex businesses, since their success involves aggregating not just the two butterfly wings of buyers
and sellers, but also technology, content, and commerce."  Further, he emphasizes "the hard part isn't
assembling technology; the hard part is aggregating context"; only in this way can one "create an industry
transforming vortex."  A key element in this regard is "understanding the features and specifications a
customer would typically evaluate to make a purchase decision.  The intricacies of such decisions vary
enormously from industry to industry:…search routines need to be set up to follow the thinking of a typical
industry decision-maker."  In addition, the system must reflect "a complete understanding of the way
products or services are moved in each industry.  How are products ordered?  How are they delivered?"
Finally, the vortex must make "the information generated at the Website…available in various forms to the
industry community."  From these perspectives, the e-commerce system NSC has helped pioneer for
Japanese steel would seem to meet Gurley's criteria as a vortex business.  Furthermore, NSC would seem to
be in his words a "New Age facilitator."  In that it is helping to integrate a large fragmented commercial
market with "many independent buyers and sellers…who will find value in a single, automated site that
concentrates information" and where "acquiring the data needed to build the content on the site" is "not
overly difficult."
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the system associated with assembling a car is similar for each car.  Autos also usually
have only one design division, so the design system is more integrated into the
production process.  However, in steel, even within a product category, each order can
have its own unique specifications and associated R & D.  Further, the process and
materials flow for each basic steel product is different and therefore varies with each
plant.  Material quality therefore depends on equipment, people, and process control.  But
managing this situation became much more complex once NSC began consolidating
production at fewer plants due to demand and supply pressures.  This is because it no
longer had the simple luxury of focused-production plants with their self-contained and
uniquely dedicated IT systems.  In addition, HO could no longer just send an order to the
plant producing a specific product.
Instead, NSC introduced more production flexibility into certain swing plants that
could produce a variety of products to order.  This way production throughput could still
be optimized in terms of the different equipment, without losing the advantages of focus
and scale.  This was the beginning of the shift towards a more flexible, even lean, steel
production system where "the inventory quantity of the distribution process will be
adjusted to the production fluctuation."  (Dazai & Maruyama 1997).  This strategy is
what has driven the Kimitsu Works and its sophisticated IT system.22  In es ence NSC
                                         
22 Retailing steel is altogether different and takes place at various steel centers, some of which are run by
the trading companies.  While at the product level, each plant and product has its own control system that is
different from the control system at other plants and for other products, certain functions are controlled
centrally.  These include raw material purchases, transportation, aggregate demand forecasts, personnel
administration, and accounting.  Management's experience has been that while it is difficult to forecast
demand for individual products or clients, they have been pretty good at forecasting aggregate demand for
steel.  This has allowed them to order raw materials and transportation on a long-term basis.  It also is
important in estimating likely price trends for both raw material and products.  This has led to a fairly
sophisticated ordering and inventory control system that NSC does jointly with the other 6 steel companies.
This helps even out the effects of fluctuations in demand among individual producers.
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has tried to mover closer to what it envisions as the greater factory automation,
integration, and business control of the auto producers, particularly Toyota.23
They call his the "Flexible Customer Order Control System" (ENICOM 1998a).
Because of the complexity and individuality of each plant and NSC, itself, ENICOM and
NSC find that EMS systems are not suitable for them, or, probably, for any large
Japanese company.  Instead, they believe software development economies will probably
be generated through commonalities and the use of object-oriented software that can be
used in multiple programs within the firm, e.g. in several mills.  This is why they initiated
E-commerce as they envisioned extending to others the initial efforts with appliance
manufacturers.  The objective was to develop the E-commerce system so orders come
directly to the NSC HO computer and then are sent to the appropriate plant, saving much
time and effort.
In effect, the TCs gather the steel demand information efficiently and transfer it to
NSC.  This works for the big companies, such as the TCs or the auto and appliance
makers, but not for small companies, such as the coil manufacturers.  The trading
companies handle the distribution to the small clients.  Since all users do not always have
a precise idea of what their needs will be, there is sometimes a shortage.  This can create
problems for customers following a strict JIT system, especially as parts makers
determine many of the orders.  However, NSC can meet a JIT schedule if the customers
specify a strict delivery time, say once a week.  Otherwise, NSC and the customer may
not know about delivery for three months.
                                         
23 As stated in Dazai & Maruyama (1997), "the purposes are as follows: the order entry business speed
between iron & steel industry and electrical industry by computer data transmission is improved.  The
production style which changes an output by the demand fluctuation is realized.  The inventory quantity of
the supply chain is reduced."
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Under the E-commerce system, though,gathering all the required information that
used to take two to three days, now takes two minutes and uses a standard EDI
(Electronic Data Interchange).  It was decided to combine this EDI into an "Open End
Standard" that will be used by 2001.  A local standard was converted into an open-ended
database via the web.  From this information NSC and ENICOM have data on each
company and everyone is connected via the Internet.  Direct results of introducing this E-
commerce system are lower inventories and fewer deferred orders.  NSC also hopes to
reduce lead order time to delivery since the system is based on the real demand of electric
appliance manufacturers.  Another team is doing autos, but it will take time to extend it
further.  In the future all orders should be done this way developing a vortex business as
outlined in footnote 21 (Gurley 1998).
While designed as an open format system, presently the E-commerce project is
being confined to flat-rolled products for appliance makers in Japan.  This is the first
stage.  It will then be extended for flat-rolled products to other users, especially autos,
and then to other products.  It may eventually be applied in the US market as well.
Presently, it is only used for steels that are made to order and not to standard products.
This is because it is in customized products that NSC has the biggest scheduling problem,
as well as the greatest need to implement its new value-added strategy.  In this sense e-
commerce for NSC is not an open market the way it is done off the web in the US for
consumer products.24  In effect, this is supply chain management that extends beyond the
boundaries of the firm, and is thus consistent with the CP model and the similar IT
approaches seen for: Ito-Yokado, Merck, NEC, Toyota, and Nomura (Rapp 1998, 1999).
43
E-commerce, as implemented and used by NSC, represents an extension of ERP
(Enterprise Resource Planing) that considers and tries to influence the external
environment on the firm's behalf (Gurley 1998), though NSC noted it did not realize
CALS [Communication at Light Speed]; Dazai 1997 and Dazai & Maruyama 1997.)25
Still, by using the new E-commerce system, the Japanese steel industry plans to reduce
inventories by 10% or six million tons.  This is almost equivalent to the annual output of
the Kimitsu works and in value terms is ¥400 billion (roughly $3.5 billion).  So its impact
will be big and will be especially beneficial to NSC, since it is both Japan's largest, most
efficient steel producer and has a focused complementary business strategy.  The system
will also impact Japan's small steel distributors and the TCs, since it will become more
difficult for both groups to compete in flat rolled products.
For small distributors, part of the reason for this is that these firms will be cha ged
¥5 million to be a part of the E-commerce system, i.e. to maintain and operate it as a
VAN.  For many of Japan's 2000 small steel distributors this is too expensive, given their
tiny margins.  Further, standardizing the order process will also impact on smaller, less
efficient firms within the current distribution system, as E-commerce's open form will
force a commonalty on steel sales and distribution.  Data will be introduced through an
Internet connection using PCs and Windows NT.  For instance, NSC has a small NT
server that coordinates the process, and customers can access it through any Internet
provider.  Even big trading companies may be threatened by this new system, since they
                                                                                                                   
24 The parts makers determine their orders for steel from the production schedule given them by the
assemblers.  This complicates NSC's JIT strategy for larger buyers such as Toyota and requires significant
additional IT support.
25 "CALS (continuous acquisition life-cycle support for commerce at light speed)…is a new concept that
uses information systems to integrate the many horizontally and vertically affiliated units within a large
enterprise and to integrate even separate companies, in order to bring about more effective collaboration."
(NSC 1997)
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will need fewer people to run their steel businesses than they need with the current
system, where the TCs fax data to NSC.  Under ECN, there will be a continuous flow of
market information, and large customers may even see it as easier and cheaper to order
directly themselves.  So far about 50 to 100 companies have joined ECN (Electronic
commerce Network), including Honda and Toyota.  The Internet providers include
Unicom, NTT Data, and Niftyserve.
After input by the customer or TC, the E-commerce information is then connected
to NSC's proprietary intranet system.  This is linked and integrated with NSC's
production system, including plant assignment and scheduling.  Auto engines and engine
parts are not involved in this process because they use cast aluminum.  It is only products
made from flat-rolled steel that are being ordered.  This is NSC's most important market
(footnote 14 on page 22), with presently about 60% of such products going to autos, cans,
furniture, electrical appliances (refrigerators, washing machines & dryers), as well as
vending machines.  In Japan, the last is a very big market as any walking tour of Tokyo
can testify.  Ships take some flat rolled products, but mostly plate, which is not part of
ECN.  Exports are also a big items, but are not yet included.
Once the order is assigned to a plant such s the Kimitsu Works, that mill's
system takes charge of the order in terms of production scheduling.  This is a very
complex task, since each piece of steel is prepared especially for each customer.  The slab
cast for each customer's order is different.  In particular, the systems controlling the order
for flat rolled products from the auto and appliance companies are especially large and
complex.  This is not only because the steel for every model car and appliance is different
in terms of width, thickness, and coating, but also because the customers want just-in-
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time (JIT) delivery.  Usually, the contracts the trading companies are managing are for
one year with specified daily deliveries.  This is also true for some of the heavy
equipment makers such as Komatsu.  It is not true for shipbuilders, as they generally have
more space and operate with a one to two year backlog.  The TCs also manage the steel
producers' raw material contracts for iron ore and coking coal.  But these are usually set
year s in advance.  This is because although the steel companies do not know the
expected demand for steel by customer or type, they do have a good idea of overall
volume, which has not changed much during the 1990s (appendix II.)  Hence there has
been a rather steady demand for raw materials with more precise delivery fluctuations
negotiated about six months ahead as explained in footnote 22.
In the E-commerce system the delivery date to the customer is also specified
when the order is made, but the payment and billing stream goes through the trading
company.  Once the order has been specified, the mill's IT system controls how and over
what period the steel is made.  This mainframe system supports a WAN (Wide Area
Network) that delivers and processes both voice and data.  Inside the plants or at HO, the
local area networks use network servers.  Head Office also has a TCP/IP Internet system.
The mills have many Unix based systems as well as a Windows NT server.  However
while the production operations are fairly efficient, NSC feels it needs more office
automation or TOA (Total Office automation) to speed up the work flow.  Thus, it is
looking at doing some benchmarking and re-engineering, since it believes there are
several other firms that are more efficient at TOA, which may or may not be true.
Generally, though, NSC has not changed its organization to use this or any  other
system.  Rather, as in the E-commerce case, it develops almost all its own systems with
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the user very much involved.  When it does buy SW, as it recently did in the case of an
accounting system from Oracle, NSC ends up having to heavily customize it.  Payroll,
billing, etc, as they relate to E-commerce are, therefore, all NSC's own self-developed
programs.  Furthermore, order and delivery are all in real time.  So management knows
where any customer's order is within the system at all times.  This is called the open steel
supply chain; it enables a one-to-one flow of data and the physical movement of the steel.
Thus as part of this IT steel management process, NSC gathers data from the many
companies and corporate elements that contribute, directly and indirectly, to the making
of the steel and related costs, until it arrives at the appliance manufacturer, and is paid for
by the appliance maker.  The information flow must mirror the product flow (Exhibit 1),
which is not easy in terms of production scheduling given that customers and products
are divided.
Because the core part of NSC's business and its biggest investment is in the
physical steel production facilities, it is extremely important that NSC use these mills
most efficiently.  This is why it uses computers and sophisticated IT systems to manage
the production system that then feeds into accounting and the allocation of human
resources.  That is, the production management system tries to support the upstream HO
activities through the flow of information concerning a mill's allocation of resources to
produce steel for each customer's order, and thus the cost of producing that steel.  This is
where the mill production ties with corporate accounting, human resources, and billing.
NSC has invested, and continues to invest, heavily in this IT area including the
scheduling system, because it already produces a large number of special and customized
steel products, and the strategic plan is to produce more.  That is, NSC is not producing
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just the most popular steels, which appears to be Tokyo Steel's approach (ENICOM
1998a and interview Tokyo Steel.)  Rather, it makes many customized steels, which are a
source of value added for both the company and its clients.  As explained above, this
requires knowing how much it really costs to produce each order as well as the optimal
way to produce it.  This was the reason for initiating the new accounting system and
TOA.  Like many  other firms in 1998 and 1999, NSC and ENICOM were also
addressing the Y2K problem and had 30 people working on it, expecting to finish and be
MITI certified by August 1999.  However, it was not a simple task for them to complete
because it is difficult to reprogram the small process control computers used to run the
equipment.  Therefore, they had to address the problem directly in each computer.
The most important impact from the new E-commerce system is that actual results
from its introduction have been even better than expected.  The speed of order processing
is measurably better.  Whereas, before there could be errors in coding the faxes and it
took time, now the new order is shown and incorporated into the system instantly.  In
addition to the direct sales benefits and the faster order cycle, the customers can now
easily connect to NSC's order tracking system.  The TCs and their clients are better
informed about orders, products, and NSC since they now have direct access to
information that previously was generally only available via telephone calls to the
company and the mill producing the order.  The new system also means it is no longer
necessary to have personnel whose primary function is tracking orders and
communicating this information to customers.  Databases and e-mail have eliminated a
lot of fax paper and paper shuffling as well.  Further, in organizing sales data and
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forecasts by product, type of customer, and mill, it is now very easy to assemble and
reassemble data for every type of steel and customer.
Kimitsu Works
At the mil level, Kimitsu is NSC's leader in implementing the new strategy that
links E-commerce with customized production and the new JIT/inventory control
paradigm for automobiles.  It will also be tracking its cost of producing these products
and carrying inventory using the new corporate accounting system.  It thus represents a
microcosm of NSC's emerging CP vortex strategy.26  Located in Chiba, facing Tokyo
Bay, NSC started designing this plant in 1961.  The facility includes docking, unloading,
and loading facilities, and covers a site 5 kilometers in length and 2 km wide, thus
occupying 10 square kilometers, or about 1500 acres.  It is well positioned near the large
Tokyo market and produces 8-9 million tons of steel per year, using three of its four blast
furnaces.  (The number 4 furnace is the largest, and has been replicated by the Chinese in
Shanghai under license from NSC.  The number 1 furnace is shut down because it is too
small to operate continuously.)  The furnaces are designed to use iron ore shot directly
into the furnace, rather than pellets.  This saves on the cost of pelletizing.  They keep
about 42 days of raw materials on hand, i cluding what is in the docked vessels.
Kimitsu is the most diversified of NSC's facilities in terms of what it can make.  It
has a huge hot strip mill making hot coils from the slabs of steel produced by the
continuous caster.  The iron making facilities are all enclosed, due to environmental
regulations.  This retains and conserves heat.  A cold rolling mill is used to make very
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thin coils, down to 1 mm thickness, other than those used by auto or appliance makers.  It
also has a pipe mill that can make pipe up to 2 meters in diameter.  These are sold to the
oil industry, building contractors, and water distribution systems.  It also makes shaped
products, which go into construction, and wire and rod, which go into everything from
radial tires to reinforcing bars for construction.  The wire is very high quality, though the
Japanese steel makers, including NSC are currently having dumping problems in the U.S.
In the making of rods, NSC is competing with various mini-mills.  Finally, Kimitsu
produces heavy plate that goes into shipbuilding.
It is a very complex task to schedule all these products and individual orders
through the mill and the blast furnaces, and still optimize the efficiency and use of the
mill, especially the basic steel making process.  The production control center thus
operates 24-hours, three shifts a day, seven days a week, using four pools of people.  This
is because, as explained previously, once a furnace is started it must be run
continuously.27
The computer center is complemented by an on-line satellite command and
control center.  NSC has a long, almost 40-year history of using computers to control its
plants and steel making process.  Thus, when Kimitsu was designed in 1961 and began
operating in 1965, it was AOL (all on-line), computerized from the beginning to permit
                                                                                                                   
26 Based briefings Kimitsu and ENICOM 8/98.  Also see NSC (1996 & 1998): Rapp (1998 and 1999).
Similar systems exist at other works, e.g. Yawata has the same order-production flow using 280 GB
mainframe (ENICOM 1998a).
27 As O’Brien (1997) explains: “To minimize fixed cost, ….a steel plant has to operate at or near full
capacity; operating below capacity wreaks havoc on unit costs.  Consequently, a steel plant’s overall
efficiency depends on it operating…around the clock, throughout the year.”  Also, A, F & G (1996).
50
continuous control of the process (i.e. PMS – Production Management System).  At that
time, it required four IBM 360-M40 machines to handle the work.28
To run the plant, NSC developed KOCS (a new on-line system called Kimitsu
On-line Computing System).  This was combined with office automation and
organization of a computer systems group at the mill level.  This was required to
efficiently operate the furnaces non-stop, since, as the mill must operate continuously, so
must the software, the computers, the people responsible for maintaining operational
integrity, the control room, and the supporting systems.  NSC had to have people there all
the time who could manage the on-line processing software.  This could not be done
remotely from head office, but had to be integrated into the local operation.  This was a
very new idea at the time.  NSC used a three-layer computer structure to accomplish this.
The process computer system controlled the computers in the plant.  Those, in turn,
controlled the computers that managed each operation on a batch system basis.
Given this structure, the system currently uses two basic types of software (SW).
One involves the massive data processing of orders, production scheduling, production
flow, etc.  The second is quick design SW system that can be used to modify the SW
controlling a particular machine or activity.  Because it took them ten years to fully
construct and complete the Works, the mill’s design and the control systems were
modified along the way.  This was due to the effects of the first Oil Crisis on the cost of
raw materials and the demand for various steel products, combined with changes in IT
and steel making technologies.  Since then, construction on the Works has continued in
response to the Second Oil Crisis and further changes in steel demand as well as to new
                                         
28 While these were the largest machines available at the time, today’s top-of-the-line laptops would have
equivalent computing power.
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steel making technologies.  The new technologies include structural improvements,
environmental investments, and new production techniques.  The new techniques include
such developments as continuous casting, rather than casting slab-by-slab, and, in turn,
hot-charge rolling (HCR) instead of cold strip rolling, since continuous casting made
HCR possible on a continuous basis.  These developments have also permitted
continuous descaling.  Nevertheless, despite the mill’s flexibility and constant
improvements (Kaizen-Imai 1986), the “strong” Yen induced recession after 1985, and
collapse of the bubble economy did impact the mill.
NSC as a whole had to restructure and closed four to five blast furnaces.  It also
began a new business plan, which it normally does every three years (Fortun 1998 and
Japan Times November 1999).  For Kimitsu this new strategy meant becoming the
strongest mill in the world by the middle of NSC’s 4th business plan (1998-99).  The key
to doing this would be its use of information systems.  Management had spent the first 20
years (1968-1988) at Kimitsu on improving the plant and IT systems controlling it.  This
resulted in a 25% improvement in physical labor productivity.  While crude steel
production in 1989 was almost the same as in 1973-74, employees had fallen from 7700
to 6000 (NSC 1998a).  But, during the following 10 years, NSC’s management had to
change to a dialogue-based on-line management system in its mills, using CRTs, or the
equivalent, that relate the mill more directly to the external business environment.  This
has resulted in further productivity improvement, as employment dropped to 3800 in
1997, while output was about the same as in 1989 (NSC 1998a).
This has meant a major structural adjustment within NSC and at Kimitsu.  In the
past, HO merely passed orders on to those mills that seemed to have capacity, without
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closely analyzing the cost and delivery schedule associated with that order.  Under the
new system, a receipt and delivery schedule associated with that order.  Under the new
system, a receipt and delivery system, with a built-in JIT (just-in-time) component, will
handle incoming orders.  NSC calls this system EDS (Electronic Data System), and it is a
batch file transfer system, linking Head Office (HO), the trading companies (TCs), and
the customers.  It is thus NSC’s interface with the Japanese steel industry’s new E-
commerce system explained above.
NSC has been working on this since 1992-93, and in conjunction with the E-
commerce effort since 1996.  The dialogue orientation starts with head office then goes to
the production planner and then back to HO, until the optimum production allocation
between and within plants is developed.  This allocation process will incorporate cost
information provided by the new accounting system.  This has allowed NSC to downsize
the number systems people at the core (HO) and focus systems integration at the plants,
while still relating the mills to the total business environment for steel.  In conjunction
with ENICOM, NSC and the local employees, Kimitsu has developed its own groupware
to manage this process, and this groupware is integrated with the people who are
operating the system.  The overall size of Kimitsu’s system has therefore grown a lot over
the last 15 years.  Beginning in 1984 in the millions of instruction per second (MIPS), it
has grown to billions of instructions (GB) in 1998.  The size of disk drives in turn ahs
gone from 100 GB to 600 GB, the number of CPUs has risen from 30 to 300, and the
number of lines of code or logic steps in COBOL has grown from 10.8 million to 34
million.  Further, this system is now fully amortized.  Kimitsu also began addressing
Y2K issues in 1997, expecting to be fully compliant and converted along with the rest of
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NSC as of the summer of 1999.  The budgeted cost for solving these Y2K issues was
about 400 million Yen for Kimitsu and about 2 billion Yen for NSC as a whole.
The SW issues and systems for Kimitsu are first, as noted above, based on
managing a huge data warehouse (one half a terabyte or 500 billion bytes of information).
This data covers production, quality control, and the history of all the steel ever produced
at the works.  The production management system or PMS (see schematic attached as
Exhibit 1) is the biggest part of this data management system, since as already explained,
Kimitsu produces many types of steel, and there are several different processes involved
in steel production, depending on the type of steel and end product.  The basic flow,
however, must still start with iron making, then steel making, and then proceed to
specific end products, such as wire rod, pipe & tube, coiled sheets heavy plates, or rails.
Against these physical or technical requirements are placed the GSA (General
System Administration) requirements: Accounting (which for Kimitsu is accounting only
for its own costs as HO handles receivables, overhead, etc.), Machinery Usage,
Equipment Management, Engineering Management, Energy Usage, and Equipment
Controls.  HO manages personnel on a corporate-wide basis.  The computer hardware
running this system is still all IBM mainframes, which Kimitsu upgrades roughly every
five years by changing the lease.  The mill currently has two such mainframes for
management and operations control, with a third acting as a back-up, though in fact each
one supports the other.  These mainframes control several Unix-based servers (mostly
IBM A/X).  The Management and Planning Server is an RS 6000 – SP2 and the Intranet
Server is an RS 6000.  They also have six Tandem fault free computers that directly
control six nodes, and an NCR-5100 that handles the Data Warehouse.  These latter
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computers control the 100 processing computers.  Kimitsu also uses IBM’s Lotus Notes
for internal communication.  The workflow reporting, mail, and scheduling system uses
Fujitsu DS-90 groupware servers, for which NSC has developed special teamware.
In reality, the true Network Servers (NSC) are the mainframes that manage the
Integrated Network System (INS) that is connected to HO and the other steel works.  The
trunkline making these connections is an optical fiber network, which, as already noted
above, NSC operates as a Class 2 VAN.  In addition, Kimitsu has automated and
integrated its office operations using 1500 PCs and 20 PC servers, with each department
having its own server.  As of August 1998, these were Windows 95 machines connected
using Windows NT.  Management did not intend to upgrade to Windows ’98, as
Windows ’95 works well enough for their purposes.  Indeed, 100 PCs are still using
Windows 3.1.  The standard application program is Office ’98, including Power Point.
Kimitsu also has 2400 dumb host terminals and 40 Unix workstations.
PMS, however, is the “core” system controlling steel making.  (See Exhibit 1).
This is why Kimitsu and NSC are not able to adopt an outside ERP (Enterprise Resource
Planning) or EMS (Enterprise Management System) type package.  Under PMS, the
system begins with orders form customers such as Toyota, the shipyards, etc., that first
flow to the TCs, then to HO, and then are allocated to Kimitsu.  (This allocation will be
based on the new accounting system once it is fully installed and operating, while most of
the orders will flow via E-commerce.)  All the TCs participate in this process.
As explained previously, the trading companies have all the information on steel
demand and do the forecasting for the steel producers.  They also track orders for their
customers, keep track of available stock, etc.  They then supply the details associated
55
with each order to NSC’s HO.  Head Office in turn converts HSC’s sales plan into a
production plan and splits each order in to two components.  The first is order-processing
that has six months, three months, and one month schedules.  This addresses the
processing materials needed to complete the order that helps to generate the materials
ordering plan (six months horizon).  The next applies to the production-scheduling plan
(three months horizon), and the third relates to production control at the mill level and to
the actual shipment directly to the customer.  This shipment generates a bill to HO that
then flows to the TCs and finally to the customer while physical shipment travels
separately, directly to the customer.  Within the Tokyo area, shipments usually go by
truck, while outside, they go by rail or ship (e.g. to Nagoya and Kyuushuu).  Toyota’s use
is mostly in Shizuoka.  Naturally, exports are by ship.  The usual time from order to
delivery is about two months, though with appliance and auto manufacturers, as
described above, NSC is trying to move towards JIT.
The second component of the order is the actual production instructions that flow
from HO to each mill, based on each mill’s capacity, territory, and product specifications.
Once Kimitsu has received an order, PMS controls the next levels in the process leading
to the actual production of steel to complete the order.  There are three levels to PMS:
Planning Systems, Operational Control (24 hours), and Process Control (directs mill
machinery such as cranes, torpedo cars, etc.).  Planning Systems uses high-speed
computers and large amounts of data to plan the best way to optimize the production of
the large number of orders.  It then schedules production based on the results of these
calculations.  These calculations are high level and very complex, relying both on
Kimitsu’s historical database and a sophisticated mathematical algorithm.  Planning
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Systems in turn sends scheduling results to the real time, 24-hour, non-stop data
processing control system.  This system uses fault-free Tandem machines to make sure
there is never any down time in the mill’s continuous operation.
This planning control system provides the work instructions for each steel product
and its corresponding order, including the necessary input materials.  Thus, the system
knows where every order and related materials actually are, at any point in time.
Consequently, there is a precise match between in-process or finished inventories in the
yard and a given order.  NSC sees these factors as mission-critical issues that its new
proprietary ERP can perform.  However, this ERP is not a package from an outside
vendor, but was developed totally by ENICOM and NSC.  Furthermore, it is completely
customized to NSC’s and Kimitsu’s operations, since no outside vendor would have the
knowledge about how the mill and the existing system actually works.  The complex
optimization model and its associated software are absolutely critical to making the mill
efficient when each order is handled on a unique basis.  It must also be tightly integrated
with the mill’s physical, technical, and personnel operations.
In this way it appears that Kimitsu’s IT strategy is being driven, at least partially,
by NSC’s strategic decision to move to customized casting as a way to capture and hold
important clients like Toyota.  This means mill efficiency must be optimized in the face
of each order being unique.  Further, the new accounting system is then needed to track
costs more precisely by mill and process to price such customized products.  Finally, the
new inventory control and E-commerce systems are necessary to keep the stock
associated with each car model under control and to permit individual order tracking by
customer, as required by the JIT mandate.  Interestingly, a key consideration in NSC’s
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thinking about its success in implementing this complex and sophisticated system has
been Japan’s long term employment system.  For the system to work well, there must be
close integration of both steel making and IT systems knowledge so NSC can actually
optimize the production model economically and efficiently.  NSC’s experience is that
four to five years are required to train someone to use and help develop these systems.  If
NSC or Kimitsu were to lose such employees on a regular basis, it would be very
expensive and the system would be difficult to implement.  But, since they know these
people will be working for NSC for 35 or 40 years, it makes sense and works.  This is
also consistent with the need identified by Ahlbrandt et al (A, F&G 1996) for successful
strategies to closely integrate technology and personnel practices.
At the first level of order production detail, Kimitsu is working on roughly a
monthly basis.  At the next level of detail, PMS becomes even more precise.  (See
Exhibit 1.)  For example, scheduling the Hot Strip Mill is very detailed and is the newest
system Kimitsu has developed using this concept.  This is consistent with the customized
casting strategy, described above, since the Hot Strip Mill is a key part of NSC’s auto and
appliance related programs and offers a potentially high value added benefit.29  For this
mill, when Kimitsu receives an order, it is first screened for Quality Design.  This is
because the Hot Strip Mill can produce as many as 10,000 different qualities of steel, just
for different cars and car parts.  This screening then determines what process will be
needed to achieve the specified quality and, in turn, the amount of steel required, as well
as the time need to produce that steel, given all the other orders in the pipeline.  Once
volume and production time is determined, a delivery date can be scheduled.  This
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scheduling program was one reason why Kimitsu and NSC had a Y2K problem that had
to be fixed.  Given this decision-tree, we see why every product and order has a unique
cost point that feeds back to each mill, based on overall product demand and the
necessary production schedule to meet each customer’s requirements.
Based on the orders Kimitsu has in hand, including ones remaining from the
previous week, Kimitsu repeats this production scheduling process every week and
selects the orders to be produced accordingly.  This weekly schedule then translates into a
daily plan and schedule.  Steel that is not used is reallocated to inventory.  For orders that
are processed, each one has its own unique slab of steel that emerges from the continuous
caster.  This slab is then made into coil that is the final product.  This is how NSC makes
and develops new steels from the information/specifications it receives from customers.
To ensure that each mill is using its iron making and blast furnace efficiently, each mill
will produce surplus slabs that are allocated differently.  These slabs go to inventory and
are used later to produce other more standard products.  This process control applies to
the whole Kimitsu Works and all the products it produces.
Sequencing, rather than efficient assembly, a la Toyota, (Womack, Jones and
Roos 1990), is the key to economic success in this manufacturing process and is the
hallmark of this newly developed system and its complex high level OR (Operations
Research) optimization method.  The three shift 24-hour control system operates to
closely integrate its personnel.  Further, every level (i.e. each major piece of equipment or
process) gets more detailed attention and is in turn optimized within the context of the
whole operation.  Major cost efficiency variables appear to be yield, inventory, and
                                                                                                                   
29 NSC’s customers; diverse demands include: “thin but strong, highly corrosion-resistant, mirror-like
finish, fine as hair, usable in frigid regions, highly fire-resistant, aluminized steel sheet for fuel tanks, and
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delivery, since the last determines when NSC gets paid as well as its ability to efficiently
meet its high priority customers’ JIT requirements.  In this manner, the system is
constantly balancing costs and physical efficiency, and NSC noted that part of its
efficiently model is managing the supply chain.  But it also knows that this chain varies
by industry and firm.  NSC is not like Takeda or Ito-Yokado, and because of this, it could
not copy a system from an outside ERP package.  Rather, as explained above, it had to
develop its own system, just as Takeda and IY had to develop theirs.30  This result  is
also consistent with Gurley’s view that successful E-commerce systems must be industry-
specific with high industry content (footnote 21).
Kimitisu’s Office Automation uses a separate database system and ach back-
office worker at the mill has their own PC attached to a network.  There are 1000 of these
white-collar workers.  In addition, there are 900 four-man blue-collar crews who are also
beginning to use PCs on a team bases.  From their inputs, Kimitisu’s management hopes
to develop a database that can be mined to improve production and quality.  They and
ENICOM are currently looking at outside data-mining packages to see if there is one
suitable for the task.  This shows NSC’s flexibility when the basic complex functioning
of the mill and NSC’s system are not involved.  NSC also shares data with other firms in
the overall demand/supply chain.  This is done with the TCs through the E-commerce
system, with subcontractors who need to supply materials, and other support services,
such as transport firms, maintenance companies, or ENICOM.
In terms of NC’s IT organization, the big shift occurred 10 years ago.  NSC
reduced staff and merged Nippon Steel Information Systems (NIS) with Communication
                                                                                                                   
pre color-coated coiled sheet (VIEWCOAT).  (Nippon Steel 1998a)
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System Inc. to form NICOM that became ENICOM (footnote 20 page 38).  Now, within
NSC itself, including HO, there are only a few systems people.  At Kimitsu, there are
only 13.  However, ENICOM maintains a regional office that serves Kimitsu.  There are
400 employees in this office: 250 systems engineers work only for Kimitsu and 150 work
for other companies.  This is out of ENICOM's total employment of 2,300 plus another
1,000 in various subsidiaries.  Roughly 50% of ENICOM's business is steel-related and
based on personnel numbers; about 10% of that would be Kimitsu-related.
Looking ahead, Kimitsu and ENICOM see their next big project as the auto
inventory issues.  This is because auto company steel in stock is currently over one month
plus what Kimitsu has in production to meet projected JIT requirements (can add another
3 months of in-process inventories).  Since each car model has a different type of steel in
terms of size, thickness, coating, chemistry, and use, this is expensive.  The electrical
appliance makers also have diverse demands but the problem is less complex for them
since they do not have the some degree of replacement part demand and the volume is
much less (footnote 14).  There are currently 10,000 different specifications for sheet
products at Kimitsu.  This is why the outside car project is the next big project the IT
group and ENICOM are going to address, followed by the varieties of wire rod required
for different projects and, finally, steel for ocean going vessels that now require special
chemical compositions.
Benefits, System Linkages, and Strategic Impacts
                                                                                                                   
30 See Rapp 1998 and 1999.  Based briefings with Nippon Steel’s Head Office Systems Group and
ENICOM in July 1998.
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There is substantial information sharing between Japan's integrated steel
producers and, as noted previously, they often cooperate in areas like negotiating a
common coking coal contract with Australia (A, F&G 1996).  The Japan Steel
Association also has a technical committee through which, after two years, firms will
generally share new steel making processes such as continuous casting.31  In addition, the
firms came together on the joint E-commerce project with the trading, appliance, and
auto companies.  However, this cooperation has usually not extended to computerization
that is heavily customized and unique to each firm (Rapp 1995).  That has been left to
each individual company, including each firm's interface with the E-commerce system.
Therefore, unlike continuous casting, NSC does not feel such benefits will just be
competed away by the industry.  Additionally, NSC can use the data it is gathering for
management decision-making across the firm.  So management will have better
information to respond to the changes evolving due to expanding competition.  These
benefits could be very important when many of the changes that are occurring are not just
technical, but regulatory and are not limited to steel firms, but also affect customers.  This
is because NSC now recognizes steel will remain its main business for the foreseeable
future, even as it moves into other products and services, such as engineering, computer
services, and semiconductors (Fortune 1998 and Japan Times11/99).
Customers, Intermediaries, and Strategic Organization
NSC's approach to introducing its E-commerce customized product strategy
seems more customer-oriented in terms of its basic strategy than US producers'.  That is,
                                         
31 The steel industry's adoption of E-commerce is only one in a long-string of such initiatives where
Japanese firms have adopted new technologies more rapidly than competitors so as to lead to cost
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NSC is no longer forcing its customers through price or availability to buy from a
predetermined set of industry standard products if the customer would prefer something
else or would like to design steel into its lean production system.  Rather, NSC is
developing and promoting a more flexible production and marketing approach that it
believes can respond to what is actually demanded by each customer segment.  Indeed,
further planned refinements in the system are focusing on issues that will improve the
ability to respond to customer requirements.  These plans include the accounting project,
the auto parts related inventory project, and the JIT strategy.  Such projects will more
closely tie NSC's organizational structure to the software, and not force its clients to use
something convenient or low-cost to NSC, but not necessarily helpful to clients.  The E-
commerce system, for example, was developed with the customer very much in mind
(Dazai 1997).  Rather, the overall system is designed to help NSC better supply the steel
the customer wants currently, and, in the case of autos, over a model's life cycle.
Management's perspective in this regard is that the functional and market gains
analyzed above justify the additional  SW customization expense needed to efficiently
produce and deliver customized steel products.  This includes the cost of integrating the
required customized software applications into its total corporate and production IT
systems.  Further, the overall system from HO to each mill perating unit enhances the
learning and productivity of the corporation and each mill.  It builds consistency,
reliability, and repetition into each mill's system and operation so that each one can more
effectively deliver products and service.  NSC has integrated both clients and the clients'
products into its strategic sales and production system.  It has also formalized its
customers' acceptance of the E-commerce customized product model, including its
                                                                                                                   
advantages.  These include BOF, continuous casting, and computerization (O'Brien 1992).
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related service and support mechanisms, such as JIT supply and optimizing replacement
part steel inventory.
Outsourcing of such systems would put NSC and its IT support systems one step
removed form its mills and clients.  The overall systems are so large and complex that
only ENICOM has the legacy knowledge to modify the existing systems or to integrate
the new systems.  These are major reasons why NSC rejects outsourcing or EMS
concepts and with ENICOM internally develops virtually 100% of its own application
systems and software.  Its human resource (HR) and client policies appear to be closely
aligned with this process and its IT systems.  As emphasized by Ahlbrandt, et al (A,F&G
1996), employees and customers use and get the benefits of automation and continued
customer service.  This approach should continue to improve sales, an important strategic
goal in developing the new systems.  Otherwise, both TCs and final customers would
have difficulty understanding the benefit of the increased variety of possible products
they are being offered by NSC.
Summary - Controlling the Future
In their study - "Information Technology, Work Practices, and Wages," Larry
Hunter and John Lafkas (H & L 1998) note two approaches to using IT in the workplace.
One automates existing practices to reduce the skills needed to perform a task,
"deskilling."  (A, F&G 1996 call this "dumbing.")  The other enhances employees'
existing skills, extending capabilities and making them more productive, "upskilling."
H & L then evaluate the performance of customer service representatives in terms of their
IT support at different retail banks to see how these two alternatives apply in practice.
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The results are instructive for this case, despite differences in industry, economics, and
culture.
H & L indicate IT systems that generate information, as opposed to just
automating existing tasks, tend to be "skill-biased" and support high performance work
practices.  They are "upskilling."  Such "upskilling" usually improves existing skills,
creates new ones, and leads to greater worker autonomy.  The IT system usually evolves
and changes with the job so there is a co-evolution of technology and work practices.  As
such development is based on the firm's original choices, it supports an evolutionary
understanding of IT's use and how certain firms achieve best practice (Nelson and Winter
1982).  Further, since H & L correlate upskilling with higher wages and strategy
solutions, this approach should be preferred when possible.
Indeed, the specific results and comments on cross-selling and cross-selling
prompts by the IT system are worth repeating here.  "More extensive use of this software
is consistent with…the potential of technology to create new kinds of information and
new ways of linking different sorts of data.  Such software can suggest sales
opportunities to its users, provide information that enables users to link together financial
services that might have been previously unrelated, and can help the service
representative to engage the customer more fully in the sales and servicing processes."
From this perspective, one can see NSC has selected a combination of upskilling and
deskilling in developing its E-commerce and customized product IT system.  Its solution
is deskilling to the extent NSC has substituted E-commerce for the previous faxed-based
system and its associated customer support personnel.  However, it has been upskilling in
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terms of mill use, productivity and related personnel. Overall from a steel business
perspective the latter seems more important.
The recent declines in steel demand combined with the pressures of periodic Yen
strength and expanded competition has forced NSC to develop a steel production and
marketing approach that differentiates it from other Japanese producers and foreign
competitors.  NSC's strategy focuses on improving the productivity and delivery of its
existing mill structure and the trading company order system through a more automated
order and production allocation system.  In addition, it emphasizes expanding the range
of products and services related to NSC's model of its customers' current and evolving
steel requirements.
To differentiate its strategy, NSC's management is depending on three basic
elements: (1) its mill and personnel infrastructure, including its proprietary IT system; (2)
its E-commerce marketing product strategy; and (3) management's evaluation of their
existing and potential customers' increasingly sophisticated and specialized steel
requirements.  Though difficult, NSC systematically collects, manages, and analyzes the
data needed to link these elements together and to integrate that information directly with
its mills' own sophisticated production scheduling algorithms.  This is because NSC
envisions its customers as having evolving steel requirements that will change and
become more sophisticated over time, given the customers' own product innovation and
the development of new steels and steel making technology.  The new system will permit
NSC to become part of these customers' design and JIT systems at an early date, building
a competitive barrier between themselves and the competition.
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A critical part of NSC's success in implementing this strategy is to track, market,
and deliver these products on a timely and cost effective basis.  It must also assure that
product development evolves in ways responsive to changes in its customers' steel
requirements.  To address th e  and related strategic issues, NSC has worked to develop
the E-commerce ordering system that is built into its IT system in terms of the way HO
allocates each order to a mill and the way the mill schedules the production and delivery
of that order.  In turn, NSC is constantly modifying this system based on its
understanding of how the system is working and how it could be improved, based on
feedback from mills, customers, and the trading companies.  In this way NSC is
constantly offering new and old customers products tailored to their changing steel
demands.  The mechanism to deliver these steels can also be adapted to changes in IT
technology, such as web-based ordering.
By getting the customer acquainted with NSC's automated and customized
ordering system at an early date, and by constantly increasing the number and quality of
its services and products, NSC hopes to improve customer contact, reduce customer
migration, and keep costs low.  They are thus using IT to influence customer behavior
and expectations and tie them to NSC on an interactive basis, particularly since the
competition looks less advanced and sophisticated.  For this strategy to work, NSC must
gather and manage a wide range of information about its client base and its demand for
steel so it can offer products in a customized and direct manner while constantly
improving the efficiency and client appeal of its products.  NSC seems good at doing this,
as well as at improving and managing the related organization and customer complexity
needed to manage the technical complexities for steel and IT.  As explained by ENICOM,
67
trained personnel who understand both steel and IT are critical to the success of NSC's
strategy since both technical streams are needed to develop new steels, new steel making
and processing technologies, and the supporting IT systems.
To efficiently meet customers' JIT demand, NSC has recently link d several
processes that now enable steel to flow directly from the continuous caster through cold
rolling and finishing.  This required developing DHCR (direct hot charge rolling), which
links the continuous casting process with hot rolling; FIPL (fully integrated processing
line), which integrates hot coil descaling through cold rolling; an CAPL (continuous
annealing and processing line), which integrates cold coil cleaning through finishing.
This effort reduced processes taking over 21 days to 45 minutes (NSC 1997a), but
required combining steel making expertise with IT system controls.  Similarly, NSC is
working on "near-net shape continuous casting technology to allow the small-lot
production of steel of various grades, shorten production time, and eliminate the hot-
rolling process."  This work will be combined with complementary IT projects.  These
include an "intelligent computer software engineering (CASE) system to monitor and
control all processes comprehensively, organically combining artificial intelligence with
a neural network designed to assist the operator in his recognition and judgment and to
assign to the computer all the jobs now performed by an operator on the strength of his
intuition and experience."  (NSC 1997a).
This close integration of organization, personnel, and technology is important as it
is well known that when conflicts arise among managers and employees in goal setting,
employees can sabotage the system and productivity improvements become limited
(H&L 1998; A, F&G 1996).  NSC's approach of making the mills and the users
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stakeholders in the system's development and evolution therefore seems very sound.
Simplicity and easily understood, measurable goals have been part of this successful IT
strategic development and its implementation.  For example, very large projects will be
divided into three or more projects, often over several time periods, so that NSC can
more easily track development, budget, progress, performance, and final results.
As with other leaders in usingIT, establishing beneficial IT loops with articulated
goals and outcomes appears to be part of this process.  For example, using IT to monitor
customer requirements in terms of products (customization) and delivery (JIT and
replacement part inventories) keeps the information loop on order, product, and delivery
focused on the customer and repeat business.  Such repetition for customized products
and JIT delivery stabilizes revenues and increases NSC's user base, both in terms of
products and customers.  This then reduces the fixed cost per ton steel while enhancing
the demand for high-end products that are less subject to price pressures.  This, in turn,
justifies more IT investment to improve and expand the system to other customers and
product segments, further building revenues while lowering fixed system costs.  Gurley
(1998) calls this use of IT a vortex business (see footnote 21).  One clear case of this
involves NSC's new color coating process (VIEWCOAT - NSC 1998) where a color
coating is added to steel sheets prior to customer shipment.  This enables appliance
manufacturers to eliminate paint shops and associated environmental problems.  In the
past, this product would have created large multiple color inventory costs for NSC.  But,
with the new E-commerce ordering and JIT production process, NSC can efficiently
serve the customer with this benefit.  The customer gains by eliminating a production
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process and being able to easily order a color when actually needed.  NSC gains since
producers who can offer only standard uncolored steel sheet cannot compete.32
Further, with such customized JIT supply capability, order success is likely to be
greater. This will reinforce trading company and customer acceptance of the system and
the E-commerce customized product concept.  In turn, NSC will build the basis for its
own business success including client and product diversification.  This helps to
reestablish its earnings and asset base.  Given current economic and competitive
conditions domestically and globally, such developments are critical for its competitive
position with other Japanese producers.  This is explained in NSC's new three-year plan
to begin April 2000 (Japan Times 11/99).  A stronger company will then find it easier to
retain customer and market confidence in an uncertain environment.
The powerful strategic benefits of such a "vortex" business are well stated by
William Gurley (1998).  This is especially true for a capital intensive industry that is
particularly vulnerable to diminishing returns due to product commoditization and
foreign exchange fluctuations.  "Vortex businesses are likely to have one very powerful
edge over traditional distribution and manufacturing operations: they will get increasing
returns rather than diminishing marginal returns.  As a site becomes more successful, the
chances of its becoming more successful increase.  The more buyers are attracted, the
more sellers will be drawn in, and the more products that are available, the more
customers will be drawn in.  That, in turn, makes content aggregation easier - vendors
                                         
32 These results are consistent with those of the Sloan industry center as reported in April 1998 and in A,
F&G (1996).  The Center's research indicated the critical differentiating variables between steel producers
seem to be R & D expenses and the decision-making process.  The more efficient producers spend much
more on R & D and push decision making farther down in the system.  In addition, the successful firms
have an articulated conscious strategic link between technology and market objectives based on
technology, people, and organization.  Indeed, research by Ichniowski shows organization matters and
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must bring you content, rather than your having to gather it.  Everything is drawn to the
center of the vortex. The implication is clear: great vortex businesses will tend toward
monopolies, and there will be no such things as second place."  (Gurley 1998)
Similarly, NSC's integrated IT strategy corresponds to the various important
criteria for success in steel or any business stressed by Ahlbrandt et al (A, F&G 1996).
Each IT investment decision is "made in light of a focused market strategy" and fits with
the totality of the firm's investments, including links to steel making technology and the
employees' knowledge base.  NSC's and ENICOM's managers, at both the corporate mill
level, "understand and take advantage of the interlocking nature of investments" in the
broadest sense (i.e., machines, IT, employee skills, HR practices, and organization), as
well as their complementary relationships.  This includes the recognition that "new
technology and human capital must be developed in use at the same time." Further
strategy and practice are aligned "in the same direction so they reinforce one another,"
and so that improvement is continuous.  The basis for this is "a conviction about where
they want to go that is rooted in a deep understanding of products and markets."  At the
same time they are "setting a very high goal: to pursue quality and efficiency
simultaneously."  This includes the conviction of NSC's president and chairman (Fortune
1998 and Nomura 1998), another key element of A,F&G's analysis.  In addition, the
emphasis at NSC along with the other leading IT users is on the "effective use of
technology…to gain quality or cost advantage" as opposed to being "on the cutting edge
of technology" for its own sake.  In the case of its work with IBM on the new mill
                                                                                                                   
particularly the integration of human resources, technology and plant layout. Also, see Fujitani (1995) on
high Japanese R&D expenditures in steel.
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production algorithm, NSC illustrates that it can also be on the frontier, when it is
necessary.
In this way one can see that NSC's integrated steel division is using IT to control
every aspect of its business from sourcing to delivery and even after-sales support.
Further, management, including top management, now can view its customer relations
even more as an extended relationship.  Previously, that relationship was based more on a
price-sensitive, order-by-order set of transactions for a standard product with a well-
known market price.  The success of the new E-commerce system indicates NSC's
customers are beginning to see the relationship in this new way, too.  NSC has used IT to
impact its competitive environment by changing the way its customers look at their steel
requirements, supply base, and product service support, so as to favor NSC's business
strategy.  Again, this conforms to the view presented by Ahlbrandt et al that "truly
important cost or quality differences can virtually always be traced to technology," and
"technology shapes the workplace."  At the same time, this approach would appear to
take NSC beyond the technology strategic model posed by A, F&G (1996).  This is
because NSC's E-commerce customized product model has already absorbed and moved
beyond the thin slab and strip casting frontier explained in that study.  In this sense, A,
F&G's view is correct on "the importance of competition in determining a company's or
an industry's level of attention and commitment o ongoing improvements in productivity,
quality, and customer responsiveness objectives."
As explained in the introducti9on to his case, the major driver for NSC's new IT-
based E-commerce customized product strategy has been its need to move away from the
foreign exchange impacts and cost-cutting only initiatives of the 1990s.  But to do this, its
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revised approach had to reduce the ease with which competitors can emulate its strategic
and technical advances with "me-too" responses facilitated by global equipment vendors
(A, F&G 1996).  By coupling steel-making and organization skills with proprietary IT
systems in creating and implementing its new initiative, NSC has moved a long way in
this direction, especially since competitors do not have access to the latter key element.
This would seem to be a well-developed, though still evolving, "Controlled
Production" paradigm (Rapp 1998a and 1999a).  This is the approach several leading IT
users examined in the Sloan case studies appear to be practicing.  That is, they are using
IT not only to control all aspects of their businesses but also to directly influence their
external environments to their strategic advantage.  Because NSC appears to be
successful in this respect, this interactive process should reinforce the Nikko research
analyst's rating of NSC as the top Japanese steel company both from a business and an IT
strategy perspective.  This is why he believes Nippon Steel is the most likely to emerge
from the current competitive pressures as the leader in global steel.
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EXHIBIT 1
Production Management System (3) – Kimitsu Works
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APPENDIX I
Summary Answers to Questions for NSC – Steel Strategy & Operations
General Management and Corporate Strategy Yes No
Has the firm integrated IT into their management and production
strategy, including using it to institutionalize organizational strengths
and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis?
x
Has the firm succeeded solely on the basis of its software strategy?x
Does the firm believe some customized software and its close
organizational integration enables it to capture and perpetuate on a
more consistent basis certain tacit knowledge and unique corporate
features, i.e. core competencies, that account for its continued success
in the marketplace with reliability and repetition important elements
in their thinking?
x
Is firm’s software strategy successful because it is well managed and
introduces software innovation when it serves corporate goals for
enhancing productivity or customer relations within its industry?
x
Does the division generally meet established criteria as a quality
organization such as: effective organizational self assessment, use of
project and especially cross functional teams, improving quality
outcomes through reducing uncertainty, rapidly diffusing learning
throughout the organization including the use of software and
information technology, effective implementation of organizational
and technical change, facilitating change via evolution rather than
revolution or reengineering33, emphasizing participatory
management, having process excellence, using value added analysis,
actively doing benchmarking, constant organizational improvement,
commitment to concrete realistic goals, effectively managing a
dynamic iterative experimental process through goal setting, training
and constant consultation?
x
Does the firm plan in detail for operational excellence including the
contribution of IT to the allocation of resources?
x
Do planning systems enable management to make better business,
operating and resource allocation decisions, including IT?
x
Do projects focus on a small number of IT goals, usually three orx
                                         
33 MIT Systems Dynamics Group in 9/97 presentation estimated 70% of reengineering efforts fail.
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fewer, with a well-defined system reaching from the commitment of
senior management to the department level with associated metrics?
Is the firm a “high performance” workplace for services? ?
Is there a heavy emphasis on improving process through IT?x
Industry Related
Are industry economics and competitive dynamics important
strategic drivers for the firm and for its use of IT in that IT has been
adapted to the firm’s particular industry and competitive situation?
Are there industry paradoxes such as: falling stock prices, production
improvements that create product improvement difficulties, or
employees’ active product use that retards improvements?
Competition
Is software a significant and successful input into the firm’s
competitive performance?
Does the firm explicitly and consciously perceive implications of IT
strategies and use on their competitiveness and business success?
Are there direct links between IT strategies and overall management
goals?
Do customers, affiliates, competitors, industry analysts, government
officials, industry associations and suppliers perceive the competitive
benefits or impact of the firm’s use of information technology?
Has the firm gained first mover advantages through successfully
introducing software-related innovations?
IT Strategy
Is firm a sophisticated software user that consciously designs and
implements an IT strategy to achieve competitive advantage?
Does firm combine several types of IT to achieve an advantage?













                                         
34 Easton, G. S. and S. L. Jarrell, “Using Strategic Quality Planning More Effectively: Lessons Learned from NSF
Project Research,” Columbia Business School conference presentation, September 1997
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including using new or better IT, while generating cross-functional
and hierarchical consensus so measured goals are achieved?
Is leadership at different levels actively involved in IT planning,
assessment and deployment with regular progress reviews that link
plans, goals, metrics, milestones, resources and responsibilities?
Does system allow for flexibility and innovation plus change and
individual efforts if they meet goal, planning and metric criteria?
Is there a clear vision making project and new software selection
straightforward and closely related to strategic goals and processes?
Does this IT strategy involve conscious and clearly defined reliance
on customized and semi-customized software in addition to packaged
software with specific criteria and goals for selecting each type, and
do they have ways to measure this so the firm knows customized
software achieves functional or market gains that justify the added
expense, including related costs of integrating customized and non-
customized software into a single information system?
Does firm use option valuation methods to manage uncertain random
outcomes since this approach seems at the software implementation
frontiers even among very well managed companies?34
Does strategy include greater use, development and integration of
industry and company specific vertical application software and
embedded software in its production and delivery processes to
improve competitiveness?
If the firm has an embedded software strategy, is this integrated or
interactive with their other IT and overall business strategy in ways
affecting production, product design or service that improve quality
and costs long term?
Do they favor increased outsourcing of software design and
development?
Does firm believe large-scale outsourcing by many US firms assumes
that IT systems development need not be integrated with business
organization and that they view IT systems as generic best developed
by outside vendors who achieve low cost by economies of scale?
That is, do they feel these firms’ approach focuses on SW costs and
such firms do not see differences in systems used by competitors?
























long-term and sustainable competitive advantage over such
companies because they believe outsourcing surrenders a firm’s
strategic software options since systems service companies have an
incentive to develop increasingly standardized products and are one
step removed from the company’s customers and business?
Has the firm established a software strategy that is open and
interactive with its customers and/or suppliers?
Has this enabled it to capture information or cost competitive
externalities?
IT Operations
Do participants own goals and are then committed to implementation
strategies?
Does the firm embed software into its production and delivery
processes with competitive market implications?
Is software technology tied to high speed telecommunications
technology, allowing the firm to track, receive and deliver shipments
or services directly or on-line without further handling or processing?
Does it manage potential risks in extensive IT use or open systems?
Do they work to ensure consistency and reduce programming errors?
Is informal interaction a key aspect of planning and implementation?
Is firm’s system institutionalized and self-reinforcing with good
communication and consensus building while IT plays a role,
including preventing retrospective goals or target reduction?
Human Resource and Organizational Issues
Does firm pay close attention to systems training and organizational
integration for all employees, reducing errors through improved
consistency and staffing efficiencies across the firm since software
can confound even routine operations?
Does certain software require special HR competencies or education?
Does the firm try to change human behavior to use software?






















Are goals or targets tightly linked to regularly reviewed metrics with
inputs coming from all levels that are often cross-functional affecting
large parts of the organization, e.g. cycle times, timely delivery, and
customer satisfaction?
Does the firm have standard agreed ways to explicitly organize or
manage this software selection process?
Does the firm have agreed ways to measure and evaluate success in
using software to promote objectives such as lower costs, contract
time, market share, product development times, or system support?
Are IT costs balanced against overall long-term productivity or
revenue gains?
Does the firm have methods to ensure increased customization costs
result in lower costs downstream so developing and using customized
software makes sense?
Has the firm created large interactive databases to allow automatic
feedback between stages or players in the production and delivery
process? And are these databases constantly being refined and
updated on an interactive basis with actual performance results in a
real time global environment?
Are there competitive and metric impacts such as reducing inventory
costs and wastage while improving the quality of customer service?
Has the firm used software to create beneficial feedback cycles that
increase productivity, reduce cycle times and errors, and integrate
product and delivery?
Do other firms or analysts have alternative measures of
competitiveness or views on the appropriate industry strategy?
Has the firm achieved better than industry growth, superior delivery,
improved control, reduced down-time or changeover problems,
reduced product or process errors, fewer complaints, an improved
product development process, and/or any other definite and
measurable progress relative to competitors?
Do the firm’s metrics go beyond financial to areas like customer
satisfaction, operational performance, and human resources?



















significant projects as well as to continuous operations?
Summary and Conclusions
Conclusions and Results
Can you summarize mission statement on the role and impact of IT as a
tool of competitive advantage for this firm in this industry?
Is it consistent with strategies identified as successful or appropriate in
existing competitiveness research from Sloan’s industry study center?
Are there important business or IT situations requiring further research?
Are intellectual property issues important in explaining firm’s
successful and sustainable use of IT to achieve competitive advantage?
Are beneficial cost impacts generally an important consequence of this
firm’s successful software strategy?
Does this company fit a profile where IT seems most likely to
contribute to enhanced competitiveness?
Based on this study is the market for vertical application and embedded
software growing?
Since Japanese competitors normally do not outsource, do Japanese
firms see themselves as benefiting from this US trend?
Does this leading Japanese firm assign positive value to improved
integration and enhanced control through selective customization?
Do general measures such as decreased costs, as evidenced by reduced
account servicing expenses, reflect benefits of a successful IT strategy?
Are the benefits of a successful software strategy also reflected in
specific industry standards such as an expanded customer base?
Does this leading IT user have explicit criteria for selecting package
versus customized software and for semi-customizing IT packages?
Does this firm closely integrate or couple their software and business
strategies beyond mere alignment?



















Have they reorganized to use software and information technology?
Has IT codified or built on existing organizational strengths or core
competencies, including HR alignment with business and IT strategies?
Have they embraced and integrated information technology as part of
their business strategies and core competencies?
Is MIS function integrated with the rest of steel division in terms of








SOME INDUSTRY AND FIRM DATA
Financial Positions Large Japanese Steel Companies 3/3/98 and Forecast (Harada 1998)
Consolidated (Billions of Yen and %)
Company Sales Growth Operating Ordinary After-Tax
Rate Profit Profit Profit
Nippon Steel‘98 ¥3077 0.9% 181.6 86.5 5.9
’99 2950 -7.0 130.0 80.0 2.0
’00 2930 -0.7 120.0 80.0 5.0
NKK ‘98 1934 3.0 73.6 37.2 14.3
’99 1860 -3.8 54.0 18.0 5.0
’00 1850 -0.5 52.0 17.0 4.0
Sumitomo ‘98 1469 0.8 98.7 40.7 4.0
’99 1450 -1.3 94.0 31.0 11.0
’00 1500 3.4 104.0 41.0 20.0
Kawasaki ‘98 1244 0.9 74.8 43.4 8.5
’99 1200 -3.5 70.0 42.0 14.0
’00 1200 0.0 73.0 46.0 18.0
Kobe ‘98 1535 0.1 84.4 12.9 -4.9
’99 1450 -5.5 67.0 0.0 -6.0
’00 1430 -1.4 63.0 -4.0 -8.0
Source: Nikko Research Center
Crude Steel Production Major World Areas 1970-95 (Ostrom 1996)
Country/Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 (million M/T)
Japan   93.4 102.3111.4 105.3110.3101.7
US 119.3105.8101.5  80.1  89.7  93.6
Other G-7 106.0123.3128.0120.3118.6110.9
China   17.0  23.9  37.1  46.7  66.3  93.0




Rankings of Major Integrated International Steel Companies
Nikko Research Center (Harada 1998) – Times per year, ¥ bil, MT, 1000¥
Company* Gross Asset Free Cash Tons per ¥ Operating
 Turnover Rank Flow Rank WorkerRankExpenses/ton Rank
Nippon Steel 0.69 8 89 3 1048 2 79.9 7
NKK 0.63 10 68 5 664 4 104.9 11
Sumitomo 0.53 12 -13 10 649 5 93.8 10
Kawasaki 0.51 13 73 4 853 3 87.6 8
Kobe 0.64 9 33 6 440 9 179.8 12
Thyssen AG 1.52 1 -27 11 75 13 293.6 13
Usinor Sacilor 1.09 2 113 2 256 11 89.3 9
USX 0.99 3 25 7 508 7 64.8 6
Bethlehem 0.92 4 -33 12 468 8 57.7 5
Iscor 0.87 5 2 9 132 12 47.1 2
British Steel 0.87 6 114 1 322 10 57.3 4
LTV 0.76 7 14 8 569 6 54.7 3
Pohang 0.61 11 -64 13 1234 1 46.4 1
Source: Nikko Research Center (Harada 1998)
Cost Reduction Efficiency Indices Major Japanese Producers 1994-98 (Average 1994=100)
Company/Year1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 ‘94-‘98 Reduction
NSC 100.4 96.8 93.5 95.4 94.1 -6.3
NKK 99.9 98.0 94.9 95.3 96.2 -3.7
Sumitomo 100.4 98.1 94.9 95.1 95.5 -4.9
Kawasaki 100.5 98.8 96.3 95.1 94.0 -6.5
Kobe 97.6 95.0 92.7 95.6 96.6 -1.1
Source: Nikko Research Center (Harada 1998)
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Expected 1997-98 Steel Related Earnings, Volume & Prices (Unconsolidated) – (¥ Billions)
Company/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997E 1998E
Nippon Steel Revenues2231 1950 1723 1683 1722 1722 1725 1720
% Total Sales 84.8 82.3 79.8 80.5 82.0 79.0 78.6 78.2
Volume (million MT)26.7 24.1 24.4 25.4 25.7 25.9 25.9 25.8
% Annual  -3.3 -9.7   1.4   3.8   1.2   0.7   1.0 -0.4
Price/ton (¥1000/MT)83.6 80.9 70.5 66.3 67.1 66.6 66.6 66.7
% Annual    1.8 -3.2 -12.8 -5.9   1.1 -0.7   0.1   0.2
NKK Revenues 978 866 760 734 740 724 732 726
% Total Sales 74.4 68.6 63.2 62.6 63.8 61.1 64.2 63.9
Volume 11.7 10.7 10.6 10.3 10.2 10.0 10.2 10.0
% Annual  -3.7 -8.7 -1.2 -2.8 -0.9 -1.5   1.0 -1.5
Price per ton 80.5 77.2 68.9 66.9 67.8 67.7 67.9 68.4
% Annual    2.5 -4.1 -10.7 -3.0   1.4 -0.1   0.3   0.7
Sumitomo Revenues 991 908 857 843 844 855 863 862
% Total Sales 85.6 81.8 82.2 83.3 79.8 84.2 83.7 82.9
Volume 10.1   9.4   9.5 10.1 10.0   9.9 10.0   9.9
% Annual    2,8 -6.4   0.2   6.8 -1.3 -0.2   0.5 -1.0
Price per ton 98.2 96.1 90.6 83.4 84.6 86.0 86.0 87.0
% Annual    1.1 -2.1 -5.7 -7.9   1.4   1.6   0.0   1.2
Kawasaki Revenues 926 823 715 688 706 702 723 719
% Total Sales 76.7 75.3 71.1 70.2 76.1 74.4 74.6 74.3
Volume 10.4 9.8 9.8 10.2 10.2 10.1 10.5 10.4
% Annual  -0.5 -6.0   0.2   4.6 -0.6 -0.8   3.8 -1.0
Price per ton 88.8 84.0 72.9 67.0 69.2 69.5 68.9 69.1
% Annual    1.7 -5.5 -13.2 -8.0   3.3   0.3 -0.8   0.3
Kobe 630 516 514 477 500 506 516 519
% Total Sales 48.4 43.9 50.9 44.8 43.6 44.3 44.7 44.4
Volume   5.4 5.0   5.0   4.6   5.0   5.1   5.2   5.1
% Annual  -2.4 -8.9   0.1 -6.7   9.0   1.7   0.5 -1.0
Price per ton 78.3 75.0 67.7 64.1 63.0 62.5 64.0 65.5
% Annual    - -4.1 -9.7 -5.3 -1.7 -0.8   2.4   2.3
Source: Salomon Brothers Japanese Equity Research (Yoshida 1997)
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Key Firm Data - Nippon Steel3/31/93 3/94 3/95 3/96 3/97 (NSC 1997)
(Billion Yen)
Revenues ¥2951.4 2749.4 2881.1 2954.9 3061.3
Operating Income 115.9 (10.9) 92.3 193.4 142.1
Income Pretax (59.7) (0.0) (17.9) 57.0 (25.1)
Steel Revenues 2170.3 1934.1 1998.4 1993.9 2015.7
Customers 2170.3 1934.1 1976.4 1971.2 1991.9
Intersegment 22.0 22.8 23.8
Steel Operating Income 79.3 (53.5) 63.0 115.1 109.6
Total Assets 4475.5 4346.3 4547.54527.3 4509.5
Steel Related Assets 2966.5 2968.8
Depreciation Steel Assets 181.0 177.3
Capital Expenditures Steel 160.6 146.8
Production & Shipments of Steel (million tons)
Crude Steel Output 25.3 25.1 26.6 26.2 25.7
Steel Products 24.1 24.3 25.3 25.6 24.7
Steel Shipment 24.1 24.4 25.4 25.7 25.9
Employees 36316 34619 31072 27583 24527
Hidden Assets at Market Value(billion Yen) 1152.4 605.4
100% Investment ENICOM (billion Yen) 4.9
After Tax Return on Equity (%)0.2 -5.6 -0.5 6.0 0.4
85
Firm Data (billions of ¥en) 1996 (3/96) 1997 (3/97)
ASSETS & LIABILITIES
Cash, Short term Money Claims 508.2 457.9
Receivables   679.8 788.4
Inventories 727.8 668.8
Other Current Assets 95.2 89.7
Fixed Assets 1587.6 1557.1
Land  294.3 281.9
Construction in Progress 70.7 68.9
Other Assets 563.7 597.8
Total Assets 4527.3 4509.5
Liabilities 3623.9 3618.4
Equity 903.4 891.1
Source: (Nippon Steel 1997)
Nippon Steel Consolidated Earnings Model 1990 – 1997E (¥ Billions)
Salomon Brothers Japanese Equity Research (Yoshida 1997)
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997E
Total Sales 3209 3230 2951 2794 2881 2955 3061 3100
Steel Revenues 2527 2487 2170 1934 1976 1971 1992 1995
Operating Profit (OP)   250   196   116   -11     92   193   142   195
Steel OP 200   159     79   -53     63   115   110   145
Steel Operating Margin (%) 7.9   6.4   3.7 -2.8   3.2   5.8   5.5   7.3
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